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Abstract	  
This thesis is a qualitative case study comparing the three Angolan peace processes, the Bicesse 
Accords, the Lusaka Protocol and the Luena Memorandum of Understanding. The thesis seeks to 
explain why Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) only succeeded in the third 
and last of the three peace processes. On the basis of the research question the thesis discusses 
changes in the political environment between the two failed attempts and the last one that 
succeeded. The approach I have used is to design a list of five criteria considered important for a 
successful DDR process and analyzed the empirical data in the light of these criteria: 1) Realistic 
time frame. 2) Creation of a new unified army. 3) Regional approach to weapons control. 4) The 
role of the UN. 5) Power-sharing. 
The civil war in Angola took place from 1975 to 2002 and was predominantly fought between the 
Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) and the União Nacional para a 
Independência Total de Angola (UNITA), for the total control of Angola and its vast natural 
resources. Questions that keep arising in the aftermath of a conflict are how long will the fragile 
peace last and what kind of peace-building initiatives will be effective? DDR of former ex-
combatants1 is a political process that is built on mutual trust and will by the parties. DDR is the 
first step in the transition from war to peace. My findings indicate that the government’s military 
victory over the UNITA, crowned with the killing of UNITA leader Jonas Savimbi, finally 
silenced the guns in the three decades long civil war. Sustainable peace became possible when the 
biggest spoiler2 of the DDR process was eliminated and this event unfolded a chain of positive 
reactions that was not present during the two failed attempts. The MPLA government won the war 
against the UNITA, which led to the success of criterion 2; completion of the reintegration of 
UNITA ex-combatants into a new unified army. But prior to this, a regional approach to weapons 
control (criterion 3), achieved by the MPLA government during the final war (1998-2002), 
limited UNITA’s military manoeuvrability and weapons supply. The impact that the end of the 
cold war made, together with the end of the conflict in South Africa were also additional 
“outside” factors. The solution of criterion 3, which put a stop to cross-border arms flows to 
UNITA, reduced Savimbi’s spoiling capacity. This criterion seems to have been particularly 
important for making peace possible during the third and last DDR process. 
                                                 
1 The term ex- combatant is here used for convenience as a collective term for; fighter, guerrilla, soldier, militia, women and children 
associated with fighting forces, other non combatant roles which include; drivers, cooks porter and alike that are all associated with armed 
groups (IDDRS, 20006: 24). 
 
2 ”Spoilers exist only when there is a peace process to undermine, that is, after at least two warring parties have committed themselves 
publicly to a pact or have signed a comprehensive peace agreement. Peace creates spoilers because it is rare in civil wars for all leaders and 
factions to see peace as beneficial” (Stedman, 1997:7). 
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Preface	  
Through my studies at the University of Bergen (UIB), I have enjoyed highly topical and 
indeed interesting lessons in the fields of Democracy Assistance, International Election 
Observation and Human Rights Monitoring. The choice of topic for my master thesis was 
therefore like standing in front of a lunch buffet with all sorts of “culinary” options. What to 
study, and what to leave out? I wanted to combine my past international experience with my 
new acquired academic backpack. Finally, I was fortunate to attend the Folke Bernadotte 
Academy’s Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration of ex-combatants management 
course. This course opened up new possibilities for combining the study of post- conflict 
demilitarization with the democracy assistance studies at UIB. The work with this thesis has 
been demanding, but not least, a very good learning process. Hopefully this study can add to 
the background material available for the scholar and DDR practitioner. 
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1 Introduction	  
 
1.1 	  Theme	  and	  background	  for	  the	  research	  question	  
 
A quick look back at Angola’s modern history reveals a country that has been through four 
hundred years of colonial rule (1575-1975), slavery, grave exploitation of its natural resources 
and almost four decades of war.  Having set foot in Angola in 1482, the first Portuguese 
explorers began to trade there and exploit its natural resources. The Portuguese merchants 
brought weapons and technology and in return they were given slaves, gold and other 
minerals (Wikipedia, 2011; Store norske leksikon, 2011). After World War II the 
independence movement began to take shape. The major nationalist organizations were the 
Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) a Marxist- Leninist party; National 
Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA); and the União Nacional para a Indepêndencia 
Total de Angola (UNITA) (Accord no. 15, 2004). In 1975, after a fourteen-year long war of 
independence from Portuguese colonial rule, the Alvor Agreement was signed in Portugal 
granting the Angolan people their longed for peace and freedom. The Alvor agreement had 
provided for a transitional government, future elections, an integrated army and final 
independence. The parties’ different ideology and politics had clearly separated them through 
the years and ended up with both parties struggling for power to control the whole of Angola. 
Distrust between the parties was growing and the volatile relationship culminated when the 
MPLA expelled UNITA and the other parties from the capital Luanda. The MPLA formed a 
government and appointed Agostinho Neto as President. Peace and freedom were however 
short-lived; war was inevitable and Angola was thrown back into a bloody civil war that came 
to be the focus of attention in Angola for the next three decades. The MPLA`s one-party 
socialist regime ruled Angola with a hard hand; it was dominant, oppressive, authoritarian and 
corrupt (Meijer, 2004). Several peace attempts were tried, among them the New York Accord 
from 1988. The New York Accord was an accord signed by Angola, South Africa and Cuba at 
the UN Headquarter in New York. The Accord granted Namibia independence from South 
Africa, and called for a withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola, which had been supporting 
the MPLA in the war against UNITA. The first real peace accord that was signed between the 
MPLA and UNITA was the Bicesse Accords from 1991, providing for multi-party elections, 
and a unified army. The Bicesse Accords collapsed when Jonas Savimbi, the UNITA leader 
refused to accept the election result. The UNITA with its strong allied support from the US 
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were both certain it would win the election. Because second place was no option for Savimbi 
and the UNITA, Angola was thrown back into war. The Lusaka peace protocol from 1994 
was the result of intense and tough negotiations led by the UN. UNITA was pressed to the 
negotiation table to sign its unilateral disarmament in return for a place in a transitional 
government. The peace was again short-lived and the final war from 1998-2002 ended up 
with UNITA’s defeat at the hands of the victorious MPLA. The Luena Memorandum of 
Understanding was signed in April 2002 (Porto, Alden and Parsons, 2007). 
 
The purpose of this thesis is to analyse the Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration of 
former combatants, (DDR) in the light of Angola’s three peace processes and discuss why 
only the third and last peace process succeeded. What had changed between the two failed 
processes and the last that led to peace and stability? The outcome of the three DDR processes 
will be linked to possible explanatory factors. I have designed a list of five criteria that are 
considered relevant for a successful DDR process. The analysis and the method may 
contribute to enhancing the knowledge of monitoring and evaluation of DDR processes. 
Scholars, like Robert Muggah (2009:4), have stated that new ways of analysing the outcomes 
of DDR processes are urgently needed.  
After almost three decades of civil war, two failed peace processes, which caused over four 
million people to be displaced and probably one million people killed, the third peace accord 
– the 2002 Luena Memorandum of Understanding (LMU) finally brought peace and stability 
to Angola’s war torn society (Accord no. 15, 2004). 
 
The outcome of peace processes, as noted by Stedman, Rothchild and Cousens, will have 
dramatic consequences for thousands of people. Experience has repeatedly shown that fragile 
peace processes have often broken down and tension has escalated into even more violent 
conflicts, as, for instance, in Angola in 1993 and Rwanda in 1994 with over 350,000 and 
800,000 killed, respectively. In Sierra Leone the civil war lasted over eleven years before a 
final peace was achieved, over 75,000 people were killed (Stedman, Rothchild, Cousens, 
2002). DDR plays a role in the transition from war to peace by preventing renewed war in 
fragile post-conflict situations, by laying the groundwork for reducing violence and promoting 
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reintegration for the ex- combatants.  It is also vital that legitimate state institutions should 
have a monopoly of the use of power.  
 
DDR- processes have over the last two decades become an integrated part of the framework 
for peace-building within the UN and other international organizations (United Nations 
Security Council, 2000). Yet, many DDR processes have failed and possibly more could fail 
in the future. Do we learn from past mistakes? As noted by Kilroy (2010), “ DDR cannot 
bring political agreement on its own, and peace processes which collapse will leave a DDR 
programme in an untenable position, as seen in the failure of that first DDR attempt in 
Angola”. Colletta, Kostner, and Wiederhofer, (1996) also underscore the importance of DDR 
processes and in particular long-term reintegration, which plays a crucial role at the national 
level in terms of a broader conflict resolution process to restore social capital. And conversely 
failed reintegration can undermine the same peace process that can lead to increased 
insecurity and violence. One of the problems is that frequently ex-combatants lack the skills, 
assets, and social networks that would enable them to create sustainable livelihoods. As a 
result, ex-combatants may return to war or a life of criminality and banditry that could 
adversely affect the peace process (Colletta et al., 1996). Providing support for ex-combatants 
is therefore central to any post-conflict reconstruction process (Kilroy, 2010). Because of this 
reintegration has proved to be the biggest challenge for the DDR programmes and also for the 
overall peace process, it is the most expensive and resource-intensive and yet so important for 
a sustainable result (Ibid). 
 
1.2 Why	  study	  past	  DDR	  processes	  in	  Angola?	  
 
The Angolan history of war is a basket filled with various ingredients such as: the colonial 
struggle for independence from Portugal; an era dominated by one-party communist regime; 
Cold War geopolitical rivalry backed by the US and the USSR, an unstable regional situation 
with open borders and foreign combatants; Cuban troops on foreign soil; unrestricted use of 
oil and diamonds to keep the conflict alive and, last but not least, the two rival party leaders’ 
search for hegemony and power. The Angolan case is interesting because it represents a 
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mosaic and cluster of factors that all in their way nurtured the war, and when these factors 
were eliminated one by one, the only option left was peace. 
 
As the three DDR processes in Angola had to be implemented in this context, all these factors 
were at one time or another influential and some were very prominent. It is from this 
perspective that it is valuable to study why the third and last DDR process and subsequently 
the Luena peace process succeeded. What can we learn from these three DDR processes? The 
then former United Nations Under- Secretary for African Affairs and Special Representative 
of the UN General Secretary in Angola, Mr. Ibrahim Gambari stated: “Angola’s experiences 
in conflict resolution and post-conflict peace-building would provide valuable lessons for the 
rest of the world” (Meijer, 2004; Accord article pp. 1). What did he mean? What kind of 
lessons can we learn? The quote from 2003 may have been correct or at the very best 
extremely premature at that time. On the one hand Mr. Gambari correctly observed that the 
killing and suffering had come to en end and therefore saw the achievement of peace as 
ingenious craftsmanship; on the other hand, he might have summarized all shortcomings and 
mistakes made during the past peace attempts and that the Angolan case would stand out as an 
example for every one to learn from. Furthermore, according to observations done by Meijer 
(2004), the way the peace was negotiated in the aftermath of the Luena Memorandum of 
Understanding might have implications for future political growth. These lessons and 
questions will be dealt with during the course of my presentation of the three DDR processes. 
 
1.3 The	  research	  question	  
 
My thesis is a comparative analysis of three DDR processes in Angola during three different 
periods from 1991 to 1992, from 1994 to 1998 and from 2002 to 2008. The beginning of the 
first two periods starts with the signing of a peace accord and ends when the parties resume 
fighting. The study of the last peace accord from 2002 has shown that peace has lasted. For 
practical reasons I decided to conclude the study in 2008 when the World Bank’s Multi-
country Demobilization and Reintegration Program (MDRP) concluded its support to the 
DDR process. And the September legislative elections in 2008 also marked the end of the 
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Luena peace process (Berdal and Ucko, 2009). I will attempt to answer the following 
questions in my thesis: 
 
Why did DDR only succeed in the third and last of the three peace processes?  To answer this 
question I will compare the three processes. In order to structure and systematize the 
comparison, I will analyze the three processes in relation to five criteria that, according to the 
literature and lessons learned, are relevant to whether peace processes (of which DDR is a 
part) succeed or fail. The five criteria, which will be elaborated further in Chapter 3.6, are:  
 
1. Realistic time frame: to secure successful implementation, peace agreements should allow 
for sufficient time for proper planning and realistic and flexible time frames. 
 
2. Creation of a new unified army: to be successful peace agreements should be linked to 
broader security issues, such as the reorganization of the armed forces and other security 
sector reform (SSR) issues.  
 
3. Regional approach to weapons control: to be successful, peace agreements should take a 
comprehensive approach towards disarmament and weapons control, and include a regional 
approach to weapons control in order to stop cross-border arms flows. 
 
4. The role of the UN: to secure successful implementation of peace agreements, the UN 
should participate in the negotiations of peace agreements it is later asked to help implement, 
and be granted sufficient resources to carry out its mandate. 
 
5. Power-sharing: to be successful, peace agreements should contain provisions for power-
sharing mechanisms to build trust and confidence on the part of leaders on both sides- in order 
to enhance political will and reduce likelihood of spoilers. 
 
 
6 
	  
1.4 Overview	  of	  the	  thesis	  
 
In Chapter two I will begin by defining the case study method, and explain how I will use the 
most similar systems design method to analyze the three Angolan peace processes and present 
relevant literature used in my thesis. Chapter three is devoted to place the DDR phenomenon 
in a post-conflict context and describe its possibilities and weaknesses along with cross-
cutting issues like security sector reform (SSR) and reconciliation. Chapter four will be 
devoted to the analytical work of my thesis. I will start by giving a brief background of 
Angola’s three peace accords beginning with the Bicesse Accord from 1991, followed by the 
Lusaka Protocol from 1994 and lastly the Luena Memorandum of Understanding from 2002. 
The DDR process will be viewed through these three peace processes and analyzed according 
to the five criteria I have set for successful DDR. Each DDR process will have a sub 
conclusion. I will end the chapter by a systematic comparison of the three DDR processes and 
discuss the factors that contributed to peace in Angola. Lastly, in Chapter five, I will conclude 
my thesis by summarizing the main findings and discussing some theoretical implications.  
 
 
2 Research	  design	  and	  methods	  
	  
2.1 Introduction	  
 
The purpose of this chapter is to present the research design and discuss the variables around 
which I will analyze the empirical literature. The chapter begins with a discussion of the 
choice of case for the comparative study followed by a description of the five criteria that will 
serve as possible explanatory factors for the success or failure of the three DDR processes. 
Next, I will specify in what way this is a comparative case study and elaborate on the design 
of the thesis. The final section will be devoted to the presentation of relevant literature 
concerning DDR as a tool in a peace-building context. 
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2.2 The	  choice	  of	  case	  and	  variables	  
 
Let me start by presenting the background for the choice of Angola as the case for my thesis. 
My preliminary idea was to do a comparative study and analyze why DDR processes 
sometimes fail and sometimes succeed. I wanted to find out what factors could be determinant 
for the different outcomes. In order to decide on the number and the type of case, I studied 
annual reports from the School for the Culture of Peace (Caramès, Fisas and Luz, 2006; 
Carmès and Sanz, 2009): “Analysis of Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration 
(DDR) Programmes in the World 2005; 2008”. These reports provide in-depth multi-country 
information on all current DDR processes.  
Throughout the last decades there have been some examples of successful and some failed 
DDR processes. According to the Folke Bernadotte Academy (2009), the DDR processes in 
El Salvador (1992), Mozambique (1992), and Namibia (1989) are considered successful. The 
overall reason was that the parties were ready for peace and therefore “bought into” the peace 
process. There are also some examples of failed processes and these include Liberia (1997) 
and Congo (2003) (Berdal, 2009). By comparing the outcome from these five processes it 
would be difficult to arrive at a set of conclusions that could give a tendency towards what 
makes a DDR process a success or a failure. The reason is that when comparing multiple 
cases (countries), the explanatory factors may differ because of the country context. 
According to Cornelis Steenken, the different context to consider may be, the Nature of the 
conflict - civil war, ethnic war, war on resources (diamonds, oil, water etc.) or war on 
narcotics. Further, the Nature of the peace – the peace agreement, victor or vanquished 
(winner or looser), externally enforced peace, the presence of peacekeeping forces or abcence. 
The different contexts are also influenced by the Political and the Security situation - by in by 
all parties to the conflict, state monopoly, weapons proliferation, spoiler activity and 
frustrated parties. In war torn societies and failed states, the capacity of the national 
institutions will determine how the rebuilding may succeed. The next important factor is the 
State of the economy- how was i preserved during the conflict? Destroyed? Is the economy 
resource based, how is the infrastructure, power centre, human resources and human capital 
and are there friendly neighbours to help and assist in rebuilding the country. Finally, the 
Social context to consider- tribal society, ethnic, religion, class structure, economically 
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deprived sectors, and the attraction of international donors - donor orphans vs. donor darlings3 
(Steenken, personal communication, 19 August 2011). 
To overcome this challenge of these overwhelming factors to conider, I decided to focus my 
study on one country. Out of the twenty different DDR processes between 1990 and 2008, 
only Angola has experienced three consecutive peace processes with provisions for DDR in 
each of them and the outcome shows two failed attempts and one successful. The study of 
three DDR processes in the same country during three fixed time periods enables me to better 
control the background factors, as opposed to a multi-country study where background factors 
can vary greatly. Using Angola as an empirical framework provides a unique opportunity to 
do a comparative analysis of three successive peace processes over twelve years: two failed 
attempts and one successful.  
Variables are divided into either dependent or independent: the former is what the researcher 
wants to explain, which in my thesis is why the DDR process only succeed in the third and 
last of the three peace processes, peace or no peace is therefore the value of the dependent 
variable. The latter are what explanatory factors influence the dependent variable. 
As possible “independent variables” I have attempted to design a list of criteria or factors that 
are perceived as important for determining the success or failure of DDR processes. The list 
will be based on literature from United Nations Integrated Disarmament, Demobilization and 
Reintegration Standards Operational Guide (IDDRS, 2006); L. Lenisse Edloe, 2007; 
Stockholm’s initiative on DDR (SIDDR, 2005); Stedman et al, 1997; The Folke Bernadotte 
Academy (FBA, 2009). The criteria are listed briefly below and will be thoroughly described 
in paragraph 3.6 in the theory chapter:  
                                                 
3 Too many donors focus on some, often success, countries, while leaving too often aside other, often fragile, countries. This tendency leads 
to an increasing gap between "aid darlings" and "aid orphans" (EU Code of Conduct on Division of labour in Development Policy, 2007). 
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Box 2.1: Five criterions considered being important for a successful DDR process. 
 
2.3 The	  case	  study	  
 
The case study method defined by Gerring (2004), is an “intensive study of a single unit for 
the purpose of understanding a larger class of (similar) units” (Rivedal, 2009:4). A question 
that is raised is often contemporary, where experience or perception of a phenomenon is often 
prominent. Robert K. Yin defines the case study research method as an empirical inquiry that 
investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context; “When the boundaries 
between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident, multiple sources of evidence are 
used” (Yin 1984: 23). Qualitative method design is used when the researcher wants to 
examine and describe the human interpretation and experiences of a phenomenon often with 
the question “how” or “why”. Comparison enables us to identify differences and similarities 
that are important for understanding the reason for the outcome of processes or historical 
events. The thesis is a case study of Angola, but it is also a comparative case study since I 
compare three separate peace processes at different points in time within a single country. 
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2.4 Research	  design	  and	  the	  comparative	  method	  
 
“Why did DDR only succeed in the third and last of the three peace processes?” I will begin 
by explaining how this thesis is a comparative study of Angola through both its failed and 
successful DDR processes. This thesis seeks to compare and analyze three DDR processes in 
Angola beginning with the Bicesse Accord 1991 - 1992, followed by the Lusaka Protocol 
from 1994 - 1998 and the final Luena Memorandum of Understanding (LMU) from 2002 - 
2008. The comparative method is most often used when a country is the unit of analysis and 
the focus is on the similarities and the differences among countries, rather than the 
relationship between variables. The variables explaining the outcome are often a “product of 
multiple casual factors acting together” (Landman, 2004: 130). In my thesis it is the different 
DDR processes that constitute the units in the analysis. Comparison is divided into two 
system designs: the most similar systems design (MSSD) and the most different systems 
design (MDSD) (Landman, 2003). Landman notes that in MSSD, comparison is done by 
controlling for those factors that are similar across all analyzed units and only focusing on 
those factors that are different that account for the outcome (Landman, 2003: 6). To answer 
the proposition set for this thesis I will therefore use the MSSD in analysing the three 
Angolan DDR processes. During the first two attempts the parties did not comply with the 
DDR processes, which caused the peace process to fail and war to resume. With the last peace 
process both parties complied with the arrangements set for DDR and the peace process was a 
success - war did not resume. What had “changed” during the period between the two failed 
attempts and the last successful one that finally made it possible for peace to prevail?  
 
A DDR process is a complex exercise with many uncertain factors that may influence the 
outcome. The study of three DDR processes in the same country over three fixed time periods 
enables me to have greater control over the background factors, as opposed to a multi-country 
study, where background factors can vary greatly, because the variables are often a “product 
of multiple casual factors acting together” (Landman, 2004: 130). Applying the MSSD 
enhances therefore the validity of my thesis by comparing units that are similar. In order to 
strengthen the construct validity4, I have designed a list of five criteria that are considered to 
                                                 
4 Construct Validity: identifying correct operational measures for the concepts being studied (Yin, 2009: 40). 
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be important to a successful outcome. The list has been derived from empirical studies done 
by Edloe, 2007; the United Nations IDDRS Operational Guide (IDDRS), 2006; the 
Stockholm initative on DDR (SIDDR), 2006; and Stedman et al., 1997. The design enables 
me to make sure I am analyzing the same criteria in all three DDR processes in a structured 
manner. Another test to judge the quality is the external validity5 test. On the one hand DDR 
processes are highly context sensitive: explanatory factors for success or failure may vary 
from case to case. The sample, only three cases, is too small to generalize the results and my 
purpose with this thesis is therefore not to generalize or to develop a generic list for successful 
DDR processes. Countries are far too different and what has worked in one country may not 
be the same in another country. Using a structured approach when analysing the empirical 
data by the development of a list of criteria enhances the reliability6. Lastly, frequently citing 
sources strengthens the possibility that others may use the same method to arrive at the same 
result. 
	  
2.5 Literature	  review	  
 
I will interpret the empirical data in light of the theoretical framework of the study. 
My analysis concentrates on DDR processes that have been conducted in parallel with the 
three peace agreements from 1991 during the Bicesse Accords, in 1994 during the Lusaka 
Protocol and the last from 2002 during the Luena Memorandum of Understanding (LMU). 
With regard to the LMU from 2002 the programme officially concluded in 2008, it marked 
the end of the World Bank's Multi-Country Demobilization and Reintegration Programme 
(MDRP) in Angola. Although MDRP formally ended in 2008 the long-term reintegration 
process will go on locally for several years. 
My empirical data are basically collected from secondary sources - as opposed to the use of 
primary sources where the researcher makes his or her own observations and interviews. The 
validity may be impaired due to the fact that I have to relate to others' research and data. Since 
I am aware of this challenge, I have reviewed my literature with this in mind and the sources 
                                                 
5 External validity, defining the domain to which a study’s findings can be generalized (Yin, 2009: 40) 
 
6 Reliability is to make sure that another researcher following the same procedure all over again will arrive at the same findings and 
conclusions (Yin, 2009: 45). 
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have been critically and carefully selected. 
This brings me to the extensive and flourishing literature on the subject of DDR. Because 
DDR has become more and more common as an element of the peace-builder`s “toolkit” as 
noted by Kilroy (2010), there is a considerable and growing amount of post-conflict literature 
available. DDR is not an option anymore but a vital component in modern peace-building. I 
will limit myself to only referring to literature relevant for the case study of Angola. 
 
There are some authors and researchers that reoccur in the literature I have studied who 
should be mentioned specifically. This applies to Mats Berdal, Nat Colletta, Robert Muggah, 
John Stedman, Caroline A. Hartzell (2007). These researchers have been influential in the 
study of post-conflict resolution and DDR. They have been responsible for numerous 
publications that are frequently cited. In the special case of Angola, the authors Gomes Porto, 
Chris Alden and Imogen Parsons have in their book From Soldiers to Citizen carried out a 
social, economic and political research study of post-war Angola and particularly on the 
reintegration of ex-combatants. Policy documents and standards for developing DDR 
programmes evolved during the past decade. During the years 2004 - 2006 a group of 
fourteen UN departments, agencies, programmes and funds and the International Organization 
for Migration (IOM) composed the UN Inter-Agency Working Group on Disarmament, 
Demobilization and Reintegration (IAWG- DDR). The IAWG – DDR developed “The 
Integrated DDR Standards” (IDDRS) (2006). Other documents that are important are the UN 
best practice and lessons learned guides developed by United Nations Development 
Programme (UNDP) and United Nations Peace Keeping Operations (UN DPKO; UNDP, 
1999). Additionally there are groups of donors from different countries (i.e. Japan, Norway, 
Canada). The World Bank and the Stockholm Initiative on DDR (SIDDR) has all been 
contributing to policy documents and standard operating procedures for planning, developing 
and executing DDR programmes. Other policy documents such as thematic guidelines, i.e. the 
United Nations Development Fund for Women (UN Women) handbook on DDR, build on 
Security Council resolution 1325 on women, peace and security. The handbook “Getting it 
right, doing it right” which specifically addresses and acknowledges that female and male ex-
combatants and their dependants have different needs in the DDR process (UNIFEM, 2004). 
Lastly, valuable information on comparative analyses can be obtained from the annual and 
comprehensive reports on current DDR programmes by the School for a Culture of Peace at 
Barcelona Autonomous University (Carmès et al., 2006, 2009) and the annual “Small Arms 
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Survey” (2003, 2005). In addition to the literature research, I was fortunate to participate in 
the "DDR manager course" hosted by theFolke Bernadotte Academy (FBA) in Stockholm, 
Sweden in 2009. Some of the information received at the FBA has been used in my thesis. 
The FBA uses the Chatham rules,7 therefore when I cite from the FBA I will only cite FBA, 
2009. This course focused on background, development, planning and implementation of the 
DDR programs throughout the world. 
 
  
3 DDR	  processes:	  definitional	  and	  theoretical	  issues	  
 
3.1 Introduction	  
 
This chapter will be devoted to explore the concept of DDR. I will begin by giving a short 
introduction and background of DDR processes and follow up with a definition of the DDR 
acronym. Next, I will place DDR within the peace-building context, and then I will present 
cross-cutting issues such as Security Sector Reform (SSR), truth and reconciliation. Lastly, I 
will go into detail and describe the criteria that the literature on the lessons learned considers 
important for a successful DDR process. I will use these criteria as the basis for my analysis 
of each peace process.  
                                                 
7 When a meeting, or part thereof, is held under the Chatham House Rule, participants are free to use the information received, but neither the 
identity nor the affiliation of the speaker(s), nor that of any other participant, may be revealed. 
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3.2 Background	  and	  definitions	  
 
The UN has long experience with conflict resolution, but according to United Nations 
Department of Peace-Keeping Operations (UN DPKO), it was not until 1989 through its UN 
Observer group in Central America (OUNCA) 8 that the term DDR was first to be used (UN 
DPKO, 1997) 
According to the School for a Culture of Peace, by 2008 there were a total of fifteen active 
DDR processes and eleven of these were in Africa. During the twenty years of DDR, the UN 
has been engaged in over twenty-four processes but the outcome particularly in the African 
context has shown mixed results.  The most successful cases were Ethiopia, Eritrea, Angola 
and Uganda. Other cases, however, have been especially ineffective, with the result that many 
ex-combatants have not been able to secure employment and transform to a civilian life-style. 
An example is the long-lasting case of Sudan with the Comprehensive Peace Agreement 
(CPA) from 2005 with no accompanied DDR process (School for a Culture of Peace 2006; 
2009). 
DDR processes, as stated in the United Nations Integrated Disarmament, Demobilisation and 
Reintegration Operational Guide (IDDRS), should be an integral part of peace keeping 
operations, both under the auspices of the UN and other regional organizations. DDR is an 
important part of the efforts to create an atmosphere so that the transition from war to peace 
will have the opportunity to succeed (IDDRS, 2006). Although most DDR processes have 
been implemented with the UN in the lead, other agencies and organisations may also take the 
lead or be complementary. The African Union (AU), The European Union (EU), the Multi-
Country Demobilisation and Reintegration Programme (MDRP) or the World Bank (WB). In 
Angola the World Bank, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), UNICEF, 
World for Food Program (WFP) and the International Labour Organization ILO) were all 
supporting the DDR process. The MDRP and the WB assisted in the demobilization and 
reintegration process. MDRP concluded the Angolan project in 2008 (MDRP, 2008; School 
for a Culture of Peace, 2009). 
                                                 
8 UN Observer Group in Central America, OUNCA) carried out a voluntary demobilization of the Nicaraguan resistance in 1989- 92 (UNDP, 
1997). 
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Furthermore, as stated in the IDDRS and by UNDP, DDR should run in parallel with other 
supportive programmes that follow in the wake of peace agreements. Following an armed 
conflict or a natural disaster, assistance is needed to facilitate the return of internally displaced 
(IDP), ex- combatants and refugees to their communities. Focusing on individual beneficiary 
groups tends to accentuate differences of experience related to the crisis and may split 
communities apart. Focusing on the community as the centre of this reintegration unifies 
communities and prepares them to move forward. This could be achieved through community 
based reintegration programmes (UNDP, Bureau for Crices and Recovery Prevention annual  
report, 2009),  Other programmes that DDR normally are linked to are SSR programmes for 
the wider security of the state, such as developing a national army and restructuring the justice 
sector including police and judges. SSR, also supports humanitarian challenges, economic 
development and social integration (IDDRS, 2006). 
DDR also focuses on other cross-cutting issues like gender, child soldiers, and health-related 
issues such as HIV/AIDS. According to Human Rights Watch, child soldiers constitute 
around 8-10% of the armed groups to be demobilised, in Angola estimates were around 
11,000. Unicef is often the leading and coordinating agency and works closely together with 
the DDR programmes (HRW, 2003). 
The goals for the DDR process as highlighted by the Folke Bernadotte Academy (FBA) may 
for practical reason be divided in to phases with short-term and a long-term goals. 
The short-term goal is to restore security and stability. Immediately after the peace talks it is 
important to seize the moment and start demilitarisation by the collection of arms and 
dissolution of the military structures.  One of many issues during peace talks is the mistrust 
between the warring parties, and by progressive disarmament mistrust can be reduced. This 
phase normally can take up to five months. The long-term goal is to help the ex-combatants to 
begin a new life by a sustained social and economic reintegration process. This phase 
obviously takes more time and will be part of a more comprehensive development plan. The 
reintegration phase can take two to four years or longer depending on the overall security, 
social and economic development in the country, donors and international assistance (Folke 
Bernadotte Academy, 2009). 
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Definitions 
Combatant 
The IDDRS Operational Guide defines a combatant in the DDR context according to an 
analogy with the definition set out in the Third Geneva Convention of 1949 relative to the 
treatment of Prisoners of War in relation to persons engaged in international armed conflicts, 
a combatant is a person who: 
“Is a member of a national army or an irregular military or is actively participating in 
military activities and hostilities or is involved in recruiting or training military personnel 
or holds a command or decision-making position within a national army or an armed 
organization or arrived in a host country carrying arms or in military uniform or as part 
of an military structure or having arrived in a host country as an ordinary civilian, 
thereafter assumes, or shows determination to assume, any of the above attributes” 
(IDDRS, 2006:24). 
 
Combatants may have various connotations but include a wide range of meanigs; fighter, 
guerrilla, soldier, militia, women and children associated with fighting forces, other non 
combatant roles which include; drivers, cooks porter and alike that are all associated with 
armed groups, 
The acronym DDR can be confusing for some who are not familiar with the term, so I will 
elaborate in order to shed some light on the subject. In the literature you will often find many 
variations of the term “DDR” Examples of different acronyms are: DR, D&R, DDR, DRP, 
DDRR, DDRRR. Normally the first “D” or “D1”, stands for Disarmament, the second “D” 
may be described as “DD” or “D2” is Demobilization, the next “R” is either Reinsertion, 
Reintegration, Resettlement, Repatriation or it could be a collection of all of them. The “P” 
normally stands for programme or process. An example where “all” acronyms are used is 
from the UN DDR programme in Congo: “DDRRR”, the “RRR” defined as Repatriation, 
Reinsertion and Reintegration. The use of so many different acronyms only tells us that DDR 
is customized and adapted to the context of each country. The other term that is used 
frequently, is the term “DDR program” and “DDR process”. In the literature the terms are 
often used interchangeably but they are quite different. A DDR program takes place inside of 
a DDR process, which is inherently much longer as it includes corss-cutting issues as 
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rehabilitation and longer term political, socio and economical reintegration. The latter needs 
more accept and takes longer time to be fully integrated back into society. According to Store 
norske leksikon a process refers to transition and development through phases, and a 
programme refers to a specific plan of action (Store norske leksikon, 2011). However 
according to Ball and van der Goor:  
” DDR should be approached as a process, not a program. While DDR processes will 
consist of a series of programs aimed at adressing the various needs facing ex-
combatants, their dependents, and the communities where they settle, it is important to 
recongnize that DDR does not consist of disticnt, linear activites. Insted, these 
programs are embedded in a broader dynamic, integrated process” (Ball et al., 
2006:11). 
Ball et al., stresses the importance of seeing the DDR initiative, as a transition from 
combatant to cvivilian shareholder wich is a process both mentally and physically. 
The IDDRS has described the following definitions for Disarmament, Demobilization, 
Reinsertion and Reintegration (IDDRS, 2006:26) 
The DDR process can have five phases, starting with weapons surrender followed by 
assembly and discharge of the ex-combatants, then to short to medium term reinsertion 
benefits and over to the last phase, reintegration. This five phases are hovewer debated, the 
UN advocate that reinsertion is formally part of Demobilization and not a phase on its own. 
But for the purpose of visualizing I have used Balls figureas shown below. Figure 3.1 below 
shows this in a linear fashion, but these phases may occur differently according to the context 
they are implemented in.  
 
 
Figure 3.1: Sequence of the DDR process (Nicole Ball, Luc van der Gor, 2006). 
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Disarmament: 
“Disarmament is the collection, documentation, control and disposal of small arms, 
ammunition, explosives and light and heavy weapons of combatants and often also of 
the civilian population. Disarmament also includes the development of responsible 
arms management programmes” (UNIDDR, 2006:26) 
 
Disarmament is usually seen as the first step, removal of weapons (light and heavy), 
ammunition and explosives from an individual is a highly symbolic act that signifies the end 
of his or her active role as a combatant.  
Disarmament can be divided into four phases 1) information campaigns society 2) collection 
and registration 3) storage and stockpiling 4) destruction. 
Depending on the type of DDR program, security and resources, the phases can be take place 
all in one or separately. However, during disarmament it is important to have an effective, 
efficient and comprehensive plan and it needs to be monitored and verified by a neutral party, 
the UN or other organisations. The disarmament can be static or mobile depending on the 
security situation in the area; the advantage is that mobile disarmament permits a more rapid 
response. The eligibility criteria for the participation in the DDR programme are normally 
discussed during the peace talks and should be included in the programme documents. 
Disarmament may also involve the collection of weapons from civilians in special Small 
Arms and Light Weapons programs (SALW). The aim is to reduce access to weapons through 
redistribution or by destroying them.  
 
Demobilization  
“Demobilization is the formal and controlled discharge of active combatants from 
armed forces or other armed groups. The first stage of demobilization may extend 
from the processing of individual combatants in temporary centres to the massing of 
troops in camps designated for this purpose (cantonment sites, encampments, 
assembly areas or barracks). The second stage of demobilization encompasses the 
support package provided to the demobilized, which is called reinsertion” (IDDRS, 
2006: 26). 
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During the demobilization phase the combatants are assembled in camps/cantonments to be 
registered and undergo basic vocational training for new meaningful work. An important 
aspect of the demobilization is the psychological separation of a combatant from the military 
command structure in order to change from a military to a civilian mindset. While in the 
camps one is well taken care of and given basic necessities - such as clothing, food, health 
care, as well as shelter for the demobilized and his/ her immediate family.  
Demobilization is, as mentioned above, the transition from military status to civilian status. 
Whereas disarmament is primarily a role for the military with assistance from the civilian 
component of the peace-keeping mission, demobilization is merely a civilian programme with 
military assistance. The distinction is very important for the psychological effect since the ex- 
combatants throughout the process are re-acquiring their civilian status. The duration of the 
demobilization phase can vary greatly, from days to months. 
 
Reinsertion  
“Reinsertion is the assistance offered to ex-combatants during demobilization but prior 
to the longer-term process of reintegration. Reinsertion is a form of transitional 
assistance to help cover the basic needs of ex-combatants and their families and can 
include transitional safety allowances, food, clothes, shelter, medical services, short-
term education, training, employment and tools. While reintegration is a long-term, 
continuous social and economic process of development, reinsertion is a short-term 
material and/or financial assistance to meet immediate needs and can last up to one 
year.” (IDDRS, 2006:26). 
 
Reintegration  
“Reintegration is the process by which ex-combatants acquire civilian status and gain 
sustainable employment and income. Reintegration is essentially a social and 
economic process with an open time frame, primarily taking place in communities at 
the local level. It is part of the general development of a country and a national 
responsibility and often necessitates long-term external assistance” (IDDRS, 2006:26). 
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This is the phase where the individual gets back his civilian status, as well as help in obtaining 
work so that he / she can have a stable income to support his/her family. Some international 
organizations and different countries (donor countries) will often be financially responsible 
for reintegration projects. Ex-combatants are a special group and present challenges because 
they may pose a potential threat to security, and stigmatization may be a challenge for the 
individual because ex-combatants may be viewed with fear and suspicion when they return. 
Many of the ex-combatants lack a social network and for these reasons social reintegration 
must be addressed shortly after they return to their communities. Inclusion into formal and 
informal social networks such as family reunification, psychosocial support and counselling 
are therefore important to explore and engage in from the outset. 
 
For the success of the reintegration programme it is important that the disarmament and 
demobilization phases have been effective and efficient and prepared the ex-combatant for his 
or her way back into civilian life. According to the School for a Culture of Peace (Caramès et 
al., 2006:4), the length of a DDR programme can be up to 3 ½ years. The disarmament and 
demobilization phase usually lasts a few months. The rehabilitation and reintegration phases 
tend to last two years. 
 
3.3 DDR	  and	  peace	  building:	  why	  is	  DDR	  so	  important?	  
 
In order for the parties to arrive at the negotiating table and sign a peace agreement, several 
processes should take place simultaneously. As indicated by the UN Office of the Special 
Adviser on Africa (UNOSAA) at the “Second International conference on DDR and stability 
in Africa”9, recent DDR processes have typically been established within the context of peace 
processes. Although different circumstances may have led to the peace talks, the dynamics of 
the talks often determine the scope, range and sequencing of the DDR process. What led the 
parties to the negotiating table?  
                                                 
9 United Nations Office of the Special Adviser on Africa (OUSAA), the Second International Conference on 
DDR and Stability in Afica Kinshasa, Demcratic Republic of Congo 12-14 June 2007. 
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Was there a regime change in which an international peacekeeping force under the auspices 
the United Nations or a coalition of states that have joined forces and forced the parties to 
negotiate? In these circumstances DDR decisions are normally postponed until after the 
election of a post-war government, with armed groups left to reside in the assembly points. 
Examples include Zimbabwe (1979), Namibia (1988) and South Africa (1990s). 
Did peace talks come as a result of an agreement to end hostilities in which one party has laid 
down arms?  
Or, lastly, was peace accomplished through war, as was the case of the third and last peace 
process in Angola?  In these types of scenario the governments are extremely interested in 
rapidly putting forward a DDR programme to make sure the defeated party cannot pose a 
threat any more (UN OSAA, 2007). 
 
Paris and Sisk have noted that during peace negotiations there are several factors that need to 
be addressed. Among them are: the root of the conflict, exchange of prisoners, return of 
refugees, human rights issues, reconciliation, interim government, security sector reforms 
(SSR), time for the first democratic elections, Small Arms and Light Weapons arms reduction 
programmes (SALW) and finally the DDR process. The more comprehensive the peace 
accords the better. Therefore all the elements listed above should be included in the peace 
accords. These mentioned factors are also interdependent as the successful completion of each 
phase is essential to the success of the other (Paris et al., 2009).  
In the aftermath of a conflict, involvement in peace-building initiatives has become vital in 
stabilizing a fragile peace. Still, in many conflicts where peace-building has been tried the 
conflicts still persist. Stedman draws the line back to the 1980s when the focus on conflict 
resolution was more on the tools and conditions for bringing the parties to the negotiating 
table than on whether the parties actually kept their promises to uphold their part of the 
agreement. Stedman refers to success stories like Zimbawe, Namibia and Nicaragua. Stedman 
points to the linear view that successful agreements lead to lasting peace as exemplified 
above. The same strategy was employed during the 1990s but the linear view was defied and 
the outcome became different. The parties were reluctant to fulfil their commitment to peace. 
The period after the signing of a peace agreement was filled with a high degree of mistrust, 
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risk and uncertainty. Too little effort was spent on activities that promoted sustainable peace. 
The conflicts in Rwanda, Angola and Liberia are well documented for this (Stedman, 2002) 
Peace-building as an integrated UN strategy was not incorporated before former UN 
Secretary- General Boutros Boutros – Ghali used it in his “Agenda for Peace” in 1992. 
“Peace-building was an action to identify and support structures which will tend to strengthen 
and solidify peace in order to avoid relapse into conflict” (Boutros-Ghali, 1992). Peace-
building, as Knight argues, should involve promoting human rights, strengthening national 
institutions, monitoring elections and creating conditions for sustainable development 
(Knight, 2009). DDR in this context will be understood as a post-conflict peace-building 
strategy.  
Figure 3.2 (below) describes a “best case “ scenario for the transition from conflict to peace 
and recovery. It is during the formal cessation of the conflict that DDR programmes are 
implemented. Even at the peak of the conflict DDR interventions may be explored with the 
parties, but most of the planning and design will be done during the post-conflict and post-
ceasefire phase, whereas the implementation is carried out during the transition period 
(IDDRS, 2006). 
 
 
Figure 3.2: Implementing DDR during transition from conflict to recovery (United Nations Integrated DDR 
Standards 2006). 
 
 
23 
The UN OSAA, (2007), stated that “ the most important precondition for peace, stability and 
human development in emerging post-conflict societies in Africa are comprehensive and 
effective disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration programmes”. The statement is 
underscored by the not so positive statistics compiled by Marshall (2005) in a comparative 
report on the status of conflict trends in Africa. His findings document that in those countries 
that had relapsed back into war, failure of DDR directly or indirectly contributed to 60% of 
the cases (Ibid). Important as it is to know its possibilities, DDR planners and implementers 
also need to be aware of its weaknesses and shortcomings. Ball et al. have taken a closer look 
at the dilemmas concerning DDR processes. Obviously there are limitations to what a DDR 
process can achieve due to its rather narrow range in political and security objectives. First 
and foremost, a DDR process cannot substitute for the parties’ unwillingness to lay down 
their arms. There must be a will to engage in a political process; a DDR process does not have 
enforcement activities; preventing a conflict from recurring can not be done physically. 
However mitigation is within the scope of its mandate and, lastly; because of its limitations a 
DDR process cannot produce development and guarantee the sustained reintegration of the 
ex-combatants back into social life. Longer-term programmes such as SSR, SALW and 
reconciliation must be coordinated and run in parallel (Ball et al., 2006). 
Civil wars in the African context often result in the recruitment of large numbers of soldiers 
and irregular rebel fighters including women and children. A possible reason for this is the 
lack of opportunity and desperations to find other ways to sustain. As noted by Knight, after 
the guns have silenced and the peace talks are progressing, one of the most important tasks is 
to provide security by demilitarization, including getting control of the enormous amount of 
small arms and light weapons (SALW) circulating in society and the demobilization of the 
combatants so they don’t pose any threat to peace (Knight 2009). Nor must one forget the 
environment that the ex-combatants return to after being demobilized: unemployment, a 
devastated infrastructure, wrecked economy, competing for jobs with other large groups of 
refugees coming back after the war. All these factors often are described as  “fertile ground” 
for banditry, insecurity and a possible outbreak of a new war (Ibid). 
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3.4 Security	  Sector	  Reform	  (SSR)	  
 
As Knight observes, insecurity in post-conflict societies is a growing concern, a challenge to 
political, economic and social development. Institutions meant to provide for security are 
often deeply involved in the conflict and in no state to mitigate or promote the rule of law and 
human rights. Many regimes, particularly in Africa, have a reputation for corruption and 
misappropriation of state resources. While the professionalism of the justice and security 
institutions has long been subverted to political ends by those in power.. The consequence is 
that the people distrust the institutions that should protect them (Knight, 2009). The 
terminology SSR is defined by The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) and constitutes four core areas: 
“1) Core security actors; (e.g. armed forces, police, gendarmerie, border 
guards, customs and immigration, and intelligence and security services); 2) security 
management and oversight bodies (e.g. ministries of defence and internal affairs, 
financial management bodies and public complaints commissions); 3) justice and law 
enforcement institutions (e.g. the judiciary, prisons, prosecution services, traditional 
justice systems); and  4) non-statutory security forces (e.g. private security companies, 
guerrilla armies and private militia)”  (OECD/DAC, 2007). 
 
States emerging from autocratic rule and civil conflicts must transform their security sector to 
be able to provide the necessary security level in the post-conflict situation in order to prevent 
a security vacuum but also to support the aspiring democratic governance for sustained peace 
(Knight, 2009).  
 
According to Colletta, Samuelsson and Berts, the link between SSR and DDR is often thought 
of as SSR coming after DDR, but the decisions on the type of demobilization, number of 
soldiers and integration into a new combined army is actually decided prior to demobilization. 
DDR is normally dependent upon a functioning security system not only  for general stability 
but also for the capacity to absorb ex-combatants into the regular security apparatus. 
Similarly, weaknesses in DDR programmes are often explained when identifying flaws in the 
existing security system (Colletta et al., 2008). SSR and DDR should therefore work closely 
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together to ensure maximum synergic effect. An integrated approach with other long-term 
development initiatives is therefore particularly important (OECD/DAC 2007). With this in 
mind one shold remember that often-authoritarian regimes and weak transitional governments 
by nature are often reluctant to engage in highly sensitive issues such as transitional justice 
and thruth seeking tribunales. Because of this both DDR and SSR can play a vital role to 
support initiatives promoting human rights and reconciliation. 
 
3.5 Transitional	  justice	  and	  reconciliation	  
 
Transitional justice is a response to systematic or widespread violation of human rights as 
defined by International Transitional Centre for Justice (ITCJ). In the aftermath of a civil war, 
genocide or brutal dictatorship issues of human rights violations must be addressed. 
Transitional justice seeks recognition for the victims and lays the foundations for the wider 
process for peace, democratic development and reconciliation. Historically the legal 
foundation was laid down by the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the 
Crime of Genocide and the four Geneva conventions of 1949 (ICTJ, 2011). Noted by the 
International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA), in the immediate post 
second -world war era with the Nuremberg and Tokyo tribunals freshly in mind one thought 
the trend was towards greater accountability for atrocities against humanity, but silence, 
amnesia and amnesty was rather the rule (IDEA, 2008). It was not until the 1980s and 
onwards with the global growth of human rights organizations that saw a policy shift 
politically and morally to fight against impunity. It was the cooperation with international 
organizations such as the UN, and major human rights NGOs that developed norms and 
practices to prosecute crimes against humanity, genocide and war crimes. Examples of these 
are the ad hoc tribunals of The Hague (for the former Yugoslavia) and Arusha (for Rwanda) 
and of the International Criminal Court (ICC) (Ibid). 
 
According to the ICTJ, transitional Justice is depended on accountable leadership and good 
institutions as also mentioned above with SSR. The processes are often difficult and delicate; 
the reasons for this may be because of a fragile peace process. Institutions to oversee and 
execute the process, the courts, are corrupt and weak, often the perpetrators are still in power 
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and therefore reluctant to engage in a long and probably dangerous political transitional 
process. Because of this complexity it may not only be the result of one action but a mixture 
or a combination of measures to give justice to the affected; amnesty for truth (the South 
African Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC)), criminal prosecutions, vetting or other 
institutional forms of reform, reparation programmes for victims, memorialisation efforts, 
security system reform (SSR), gender justice, various local and indigenous practices of 
dispute settlements and reconciliation (ICTJ, 2010). A report by former UN Secretary-
General Kofi Annan highlighted especially the role of local trials and dispute settlements in 
his 2004 report on “ The Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in Conflict and Post-Conflict 
Societies” (Ibid). 
 
Observed by the Second International Conference on DDR and Stability in Africa, (OUSAA, 
2007) transitional justice focuses on justice and accountability and DDR focuses on stability 
and security. Even though the programmes work through different means, both aim at long-
term peace and stability. Failure of DDR processes to establish good disarmament 
programmes and re-establish legitimate state control of the use of force may jeopardize 
thesecurity situation and diminish the prospects for transitional justice. Conversely DDR 
carried out in situations without recourse to or in coordination with justice mechanisms can 
increase tension and create gross inequities between ex-combatants and victims and miss 
opportunities for a sustained reintegration (UN/OSAA, 2007). Arguments that often speak in 
disfavour of DDR as noted by the ICTJ, are that DDR programmes reward bad behaviour, the 
ex-combatants receive all benefits and the victims by contrast receive nothing.  The risk is 
that increasing disadvantages may give rise to new grievances that could increase tension and 
resistance by the local community towards the ex-combatants (ICTJ 2010). How to enclose 
both groups of beneficiaries, the victims and the ex- combatants? The International Centre for 
Transitional Justice advocates that guaranteeing that claims of victims will be addressed 
through reparation and strong links between these programmes should be adapted because 
justice-enhancing measures may also facilitate better grounds for reintegration in the 
receiving communities. 
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3.6 Key	  criteria	  considered	  to	  be	  important	  for	  a	  successful	  DDR	  process	  
 
In this part I will go into detail with each criterion that is considered to be important for a 
successful outcome of DDR processes. DDR is part of a wider peace process and external 
factors may influence the progress and outcome of the DDR process. A successful DDR 
process must take an integrated approach not only through its technical disarmament and 
demobilization but also through trust building and political reconciliation. Described by 
Berdal et al., “DDR programmes, however well designed and resourced, can never carry 
“peace processes” on their own but must, if they are to be successful, form part of wider 
political process” (Berdal et al., 2009:6). In her paper Edloe (2007) argues that experience has 
shown that early and thorough consideration of a DDR plan is most likely to lead to a 
sustainable peace. This means that DDR must be thought of and implemented in the peace 
accords itself and not dealt with at a later occasion. Muggah (2009) raises the question of 
what constitutes a “successful” DDR process, and how to measure it? Muggah et al., says 
that: “[…] there is a mounting unease among policy-makers and aid workers that DDR lacks 
clear benchmarks or metrics” (Muggah et al., 2009:3). Muggah et al. have observed that there 
is a gap between, on the one hand, what policy-makers see as important, and on the other 
hand, what the practitioner and peace-keepers in the field prioritise. The DDR practitioners in 
the field naturally prioritise concrete delivery – the evidence based DDR  – at the expense of 
thoroughly elaborated monitoring and evaluation reports (Ibid). Regardless of method,       “ 
Appropriate metrics of success, the indicators, impacts and outcomes of DDR – together with 
an analysis of what and why it does or does not work  – are urgently required” (Muggah et al., 
2010:4). The lack of good metrics and success indicators has also been a challenge when 
designing my thesis. The factors and criteria for analysing the Angolan DDR processes will 
be discussed below. 
Some of the weaknesses of DDR processes have been the rather “fixed” sequencing of the 
concept by emphasising too much on the “DD” at the expense of confidence building and the 
longer-term activities such as the reintegration phase. Muggah argues that because 
programme goals often have been set only to measure success by the number of weapons 
collected rather than to the extent these initiatives have actually provided stability or 
improved human security, successful DDR processes are therefore a question for debate 
(Muggah, 2005). Only relating to the “DD” outcome may be misleading and give false 
impression to the stakeholders involved. However, this is still the case in many programmes, 
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and as Muggah states in his paper, there is growing evidence to the contrary. The number of 
arms collected is not proportional to the improved  “level” of peace achieved. Funds are more 
easily spent on activities like weapons reduction programmes as they are more “visible” and 
thereby more controllable than long-term reintegration programmes (Ibid). 
 
Many organizations like the UN (UNDP, UN DPKO), the World Bank, SIDDR, and various 
scholars and practitioners all experienced in DDR have made large and comprehensive reports 
about the lessons learned. Their reports derive from experiences from various DDR processes 
and have tried to come up with a set of useful criteria on how to find right ways of 
introducing DDR in each particular situation. Berdal et al. have observed that DDR 
programmes should be developed in a local context and state that ”there are limitations and 
perhaps dangers in applying universal DDR strategies in highly specific local conditions” 
(Berdal et al., 2009:8). DDR programmes should therefore be nationally orientated and make 
use of experiences from previous programmes and learn from their mistakes and 
shortcomings.  
 
In the light of the need to come up with better analyses of success and failures I have designed 
a list of five criteria or factors that are considered important for determining the success or 
failure of a DDR process. Each element in the list has been carefully analyzed and extracted 
from literature reviews in the field of DDR. The selection of each criterion addresses both 
strategic and political issues and, more specifically, disarmament, demobilization and 
reintegration. The five criteria are developed from the SIDDR working group (2006), the UN 
Integrated Demobilization and Reintegration Standards Operational Guide (IDDRS 2006), 
Edloe (2007), Stedman et al. (1997) and the Folke Bernadotte Academy (FBA) DDR 
Management Course (2009). The empirical data from the three Angolan peace processes will 
be viewed and analysed in the light of these criteria.  
 
Criterion 1. Realistic time frame: to secure successful implementation, peace agreements 
should allow sufficient time for proper planning and realistic and flexible time frames. 
Sufficient time and flexible time frames is described by both the IDDRS in the Operational 
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Guide, and by Edloe in her research: “ Best practices for Successful Disarmament, 
Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR)”. To start with the IDDRS it describes that a DDR 
process should be planned and coordinated within the framework of the peace process. 
Furthermore, it should be flexible and carefully adapted to meet the specific needs of a 
particular country. Planning should therefore involve safety and security, coordination; 
assessment, monitoring and evaluation; information and sensitization; and lastly a transition 
with an exit strategy (IDDRS, 2006).  
According to Edloe: “ A peace agreement must provide for details of the DDR process from 
the outset” (Edloe, 1997: 5). Edloe argues for the importance of including DDR into the 
framework of the peace process, and the time frames should be realistic. The reason for this is 
that the warring parties may be reluctant to comply unless it is not part of the initial peace 
treaty. Furthermore as noted by Edloe:  
“Planning of the DDR process must include flexible time frames set for the beginning 
and end of the disarmament and demobilization phases; including plan for the collection 
of weapons; number and plan for cantonment sites; building institutions for overseeing 
and management of the DDR process” (Edloe, 2007:5) 
 
The time frames must be detailed enough to allow for a specified time for the beginning and 
the end of each phase so that one does not proceed to the next phase before the previous one 
is completed. Moreover, as she has shown with reference to the DDR processes in Guatemala 
and Sierra Leone, that ”early consideration and implementation of a DDR plan in a peace 
agreement reduces the risk that warring parties will resume fighting and increases the 
likelihood that they will maintain an agreed-upon ceasefire” (Edloe, 1997: 6). 
 
Criterion 2. Reorganization of the armed forces into a new unified army: to be successful, 
peace agreements should be linked to broader security issues, such as the reorganization of 
the armed forces and other security sector reform (SSR) issues. The IDDRS Operational 
Guide states the need to establish links with other security, humanitarian, peace-building and 
recovery programmes: 
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“DDR is a key component for national and international efforts towards establishing, a 
secure environment, without which reconciliation and long-term development will not be 
achieved. Links should therefore be established from the start among DDR and other 
security, humanitarian, peace building and recovery programmes” (IDDRS, 2006:39).  
 
The link with the legislative institutions is important in order to broaden the concept of DDR. 
SSR (reforms of the security system) lays the foundation for DDR and allows for the granting 
of amnesty (IDDRS, 2006). Linking DDR to SSR enables the DDR process to be integrated 
within the long-term development and reconciliation process. Licklider (2008), states that 
“Integration means that individuals are brought into the new military in positions similar to 
the ones they occupied in prior organisations which were in combat with their own” (Knight, 
2009: 9). Furthermore, according to Knight, those soldiers who do not demobilize may have a 
future in a new unified army. As the experiences of the DDR/SSR process in Cambodia and 
the Democratic Republic of Congo, (DRC) show “the adoption of an effective SSR hinges on 
the success of the process of demobilizing combatants” (Knight, 2009: 14).  
 
Moreover, a unified army can often provide order and also the creation of jobs in a divided 
society. This type of reintegration is a critical factor for successful post-conflict peace 
building (Knight 2009). Rupiya and Njeri (2000) indicate that the warring factions may use 
the creation of a unified army as a window of opportunity for future reconciliation. 
Furthermore according to Knight:  
“Progress on integration greatly enhances the wider process of reconciliation and 
constitutes credible signals of conciliatory intent among former enemies. Implementation 
serves as a concrete signal of a genuine commitment to peace as signatories to an 
agreement prove willing to endure the costs associated with both compromising their 
original war aims and withstanding potential challenges from within their own groups” 
(Knight, 2009:5). 
 
Knight, also points to failure of military integration, “[…] often leading to or constituting an 
element of a wider failure of the peace process […]” (Ibid:8). 
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According to Ball et al.: “ DDR should be viewed as a part of a broader security, stabilization 
and recovery strategy, rather than a stand-alone intervention” (Ball et al., 2006:11). This is 
also in alignment with the IDDRS Operational Guide that advocates the importance of 
integrated approaches. Security in all sectors of the society such as Army, Police and other 
relevant Security forces should be addressed in parallel.  
 
Criterion 3. Regional approach to weapons control: to be successful, peace agreements 
should take a comprehensive approach towards disarmament and weapons control, and 
include a regional approach to weapons control and management in order to stop cross-border 
arms flows. According to the IDDRS Operational Guide: “Disarmament is the first stage of 
the DDR process, and operational decisions made at this stage will have an impact on the 
whole process” (IDDRS, 2006:21). The IDDRS stresses that the disarmament should be 
comprehensive and include the collection of weapons from individuals and from arms supply. 
In the immediate post-war environment there is a window of opportunity to establish links 
with both security and development through a SALW program. The SALW program should 
be directed to include a national strategy to reduce the proliferation of guns (Ibid). Edloe 
argues that DDR processes must: “ Develop a regional approach to achieve disarmament”.  
It is a well known saying that “weapons knows no boundaries”, but according to Edloe 
“demilitarization knows no boundaries” as well, and she recommends developing a regional 
approach to disarmament. Edloe says that: 
“By employing regional approach in southern Africa, the UN has been able to focus on  
confidence-building and transparency measures in a region where there is a history of 
regional conflict and violence” (Edloe, 1997:11). 
 
Edloe refers to the successful work of the Economic Community of West African States 
Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) that intervened in the civil war in Liberia (1989-1996) and 
negotiated an agreement for lasting peace and prevented the conflict from spreading 
throughout West Africa. The opposite of this statement reaffirms the importance of the 
observation: “Well-executed national disarmament efforts have proven futile when no 
attention is paid to cross-border arms flows” (Edloe, 1997:11). Still with this positive 
experience one needs to focus on the context this was executed in. This initiative has inspired 
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African leaders and has built confidence in resolving conflict. Building on this experience 
successful disarmament needs to be linked to a regional approach and in addition a UN 
sanctioned arms embargo.  
 
Moreover, an arms embargo ensures a formal commitment of neighbouring states to comply 
by not supplying arms into the conflict area. These initiatives are the best to address problems 
of proliferation of small arms and cross-border transfers (Edloe, 2007). In Mozambique, 
which is described as a success case (Stedman, 2002), the reunification of 15,000 men and the 
disarmament and demobilization of the surplus ex-combatants on each side probably aided to 
the completion of DDR before the 1994 elections (Karbo, Tony and Mutisi, Matha (2007). 
 
Criterion 4. The role of the UN: To secure successful implementation of peace agreements, 
the UN should participate in the negotiations of peace agreements from the outset and be 
granted sufficient resources to carry out its mandate. As stated by the Folke Bernadotte 
Academy, the primary objective by establishing national institutions and joint committees is 
to ensure local ownership, the parties must be shareholders in their process (FBA, 2009).  
 
Ball et al. say that:  
“Successful DDR processes require the support of key international actors in 
developing mediation mechanisms and exerting coordinated political, economic and 
security pressure for implementing DDR in the context of the broader peace process” 
(Ball et al., 2006:9). 
Ball et al. see the role of the international community to assist in the establishment of what 
she calls high-level security commissions to support DDR and other SSR activities. On the 
other hand, the international community should pressure the parties to comply by the 
deployment of bilateral or multilateral security forces with a robust mandate that can enforce 
the peace agreement (Ibid). Stedman argues that:  
“Where international custodians have created and implemented coherent, effective 
strategies for protecting peace and managing spoilers, damage has been limited and 
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peace has triumphed. Where international custodians have failed to develop and 
implement such strategies, spoilers have succeeded at the cost of hundreds of 
thousands of lives” (Stedman, 1997:6). 
Stedman points to the role international actors can play or not play in settling the peace. 
Providing the UN or other organizations with a robust mandate, resources and a clear 
knowledge of the intention of the parties to the conflict. This strategy can make the difference 
of the outcome and the life or death for the many hundreds of thousands of people depending 
on the peace agreement.   
 
According to the UN DPKO: “The military observers play a vital role in building confidence 
among the ex-combatants during the disarmament process” (UN DPKO, 1999:71). 
International neutral observers can do this by verifying and monitoring the progress of 
disarmament and demobilization. Furthermore, as noted by the IDDRS: “Neutral international 
monitors should assess the strength, arms-to-combatant ratio, profile and number of those 
associated with armed forces” (IDDRS, 2006:172). Trust among the parties is often an 
obstacle to peace, and international observers have an important role to inform the parties and 
build trust during the disarmament and demobilization phase (FBA, 2009). The IDDRS points 
out that through communication and sensitization national ownership and broad based 
participation can make it easier for ex-combatants to be accepted in the communities that 
receive them. Participation in the DDR process should be broad-based and represent 
government ministries, civil society organizations, and the private sector (IDDRS, 2006).  
Furthermore, the UN can provide neutral military observers (MILOBs), peace-keeping forces 
and neutral police (UNPOL) to monitor progress and assist in each DDR phase. The military 
component may contribute to the DDR programme by providing security at the disarmament 
and demobilization sites and securing routes that will be used by the parties as well as 
providing transport. Furthermore the MILOBs and UNPOL may engage in information 
gathering and sensitization, programme-monitoring and reporting on the compliance of the 
parties to the peace accord. UNPOL may also assist the local police in law and order (IDDRS, 
2006).  
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According to the UN DPKO, “The United Nations should be involved early on in the 
negotiation process, particularly those departments and agencies that would be required to 
implement the elements of the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration plan” (UN 
DPKO, 1999:27). The UN should also encourage the parties to incorporate the DDR process 
into the final peace agreement. Additionally the UN should also have resources to provide 
negotiating guidance and assistance in design, monitoring and verification of the DDR 
process (Ibid). It is therefore important that the UN should be early involved since the UN 
often will be in charge of the independent monitoring and verification of the peace agreement 
and be allocated the resources needed to perform its task. 
 
Criterion 5. Power-sharing: to be successful peace agreements should contain provisions for 
power-sharing mechanisms as a means to create trust and confidence on part of leaders on 
both sides- in order to enhance political will and reduce likelihood of spoilers. 
 Timothy D. Sisk (1996) state (according to Stedman, 1997) that: “ 
[…] successful power-sharing depends on "a core of moderate, integrated elites [that] has 
a deeply imbued sense of interdependence and shared or common destiny," Most 
recommendations for power-sharing in civil wars simply assume parties are willing to 
share power (Stedman, 1997:8). 
Furthermore: “[…] the most perfectly crafted power-sharing institutions in the world are 
useless if one of the parties does not want to share power” (Ibid:8). Stedman argues that 
crafters of peace settlements must be prepared for spoiling activities and violence in the wake 
of a peace agreement. Most DDR practitioners and scholars identify the importance of 
political will and trust as a primary success factor.  
According to Ball et al., there must be a buy- in from the parties to a conflict:  
“ For DDR to succeed, both the leaders involved in the peace negotiations and their field 
commanders need to be prepared to assume responsibility for implementing the peace 
agreement including the DDR process, and to exert the leadership necessary for its 
implementation” (Ball et al., 2006:9).  
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As noted by Edloe, “The most successful DDR programmes were those in which all parties to 
the conflict demonstrated a desire to respect the terms of ceasefire and peace agreement as 
was the case from 2002 in Sierra Leone” (Edloe, 2007:7). According to the UN DPKO10, 
experience from DDR processes in both Sierra Leone and Liberia has shown that: “Key 
amongst the many issues that contributed to the successful implementation of DDR in both 
countries was the building of trust between the parties.” (UN DPKO, 2010:25). The trust-
building measures in Sierra Leone had two inception points. On the one hand, the DDR 
programme had to avoid the notion that the perpetrators were being rewarded through 
participation in the programme. On the other hand, the former combatants needed to gain 
benefits that met their needs and aspirations in order to participate in the DDR programme 
(UN DPKO, 2010). Moreover, building on experience from Côte d’Ivoire: “[… ] lack of trust 
in the peace process constitutes a major challenge for the implementation of an effective 
disarmament process and the reunification of Côte d’Ivoire (UN DPKO, 2010:8).  
Power-sharing may in some circumstances also be useful to build trust among former warring 
parties, as noted by Caroline A. Hartzell and Matthew Hoddie (2007), Sidney Noel (2005) 
and Helga Malmin Binningsbø (2006);  
“[…] power-sharing is a common feature of negotiated settlements to civil war. The 
logic of creating power-sharing and power-dividing institutions is that these 
mechanisms minimize the capacity of any one party to control the post-war state and 
potentially use this position of influence to threaten the interests of survival of their 
rivals” (Hartzell et al., 2007:92).  
 
Moreover, as indicated by Helga Malmin Binningsbø (2006), her studies tend to conclude that 
there is a positive relation between power-sharing and peace duration: 
 
 
 
                                                 
10 United Nations Peace Keeping Operations (UN DPKO), launched in 2010 its DDR -  ”in peace operations” retrospective paper 
Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration retrospective is intended to increase awareness of the role of DDR in past and current peace 
operations..  
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“[…] power-sharing democracy is the best approach to achieve sustainable peace in all 
post conflict societies, regardless of how the conflicts end […] the more 
comprehensive the post-conflict power-sharing, the longer is the post-conflict peace 
survival” (Binningsbø, 2006: 19).11 
 
 According to Sidney Noel:  
“Typically, power-sharing mechanisms are intended to serve the dual purpose of 
promoting post-conflict peace-building and serving as a foundation for the future growth 
of democratic institutions. […] The guiding principle, implicit or explicit, is that power-
sharing is essential for the building of sustainable peace and democratic governance in 
ethnically divided societies” (Noel et al., 2005: xi).  
 
Ian S. Spears (Noel et al., 2005), argue that there are different experiences of power sharing 
and from his observations one should be cautious about its effect in every context. Successful 
cases such as the one from South Africa between the National Party and African National 
Congress, (ANC) stand out in stark contrast to the more troublesome experiences from other 
parts of Africa where power sharing didn’t have the anticipated effect:  
“Power-sharing has been repeatedly advocated as a method of post-conflict 
governance in Africa. In virtually all cases, however, the results have been the 
same: inclusive power-sharing agreements have been resisted by local leaders or, if 
accepted, have rarely been fully implemented or adhered to over the long term” 
(Noel et al., 2005: 184).  
 
Of the reasons for there being more difficulties in Africa Spears observes: “Instead of power-
sharing, local disputants often prefer other more self-interested and, in their view, more 
durable approaches to peace – such as complete victory over their opponents” (Ibid: 185). 
Building trust as seen in this part can be done in several ways.  However selecting the choice 
of option should be carefully assessed. It should not be based on a “blue-print” peace-building 
lessons learned reports, but be employed according to the context of the country and in close 
cooperation with the parties. The challenge of power-sharing based on the above mentioned 
                                                 
11 Binningsbø’s findings build on research from Hartzell 1999, Hartzell et al. 2001, Hartzell and Hoddie 2003, Walter 2002). Cited with 
permission 03.06.2011 
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literature is the fact that rivals have to share power. Previous antagonists need to abandon 
their interest in total control of the state, they must share power with the one they least trust. 
Secondly, institutions set to provide for trust building and power-sharing are often not 
transparent and not capable of effectively serving its proposed function, particularly in 
countries devastated from years of civil war.  
 
Harzell et al. note “The willingness of adversaries to endure these costs over time has the 
potential to serve as a costly indicator of their commitment to an enduring peace” (Hartzell et 
al., 2007:4). 
 
In the next chapter I will start by presenting the background and evolution of the Angolan 
conflict from the early days of independence from Portugal in 1975 to the peace negotiations 
that led to the signing of the Bicesse Peace Accord in 1991. My analysis will be devoted to 
the three peace processes that had provisions for a DDR process; the Bicesse, the Lusaka and 
the Luena peace processes. The procedure I intend to use is first, to briefly present the 
background to each peace process followed by an analysis of the empirical data using the five 
criteria considered important for a successful DDR process as mentioned above. The analysis 
will be summed up in a sub-conclusion and presented in a table. The same procedure will be 
used to analyze the Lusaka and the Luena DDR process. Finally, I will do a systematic 
comparative analysis of the outcome of all three DDR processes. The findings will be 
presented in a summary report and in a table. 
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4 Analysis:	  Comparing	  the	  three	  Angolan	  peace	  processes	  
 
4.1 Introduction	  
 
This chapter will provide information on the three peace processes which are the basis for my 
analysis. I will start with a short introduction to the background of the Angolan conflict. Next, 
I will present each peace agreement and follow up with an analysis of the performance of the 
DDR process conducted during each peace process. The DDR processes will be analyzed 
according to the key criteria considered important for a successful DDR process: 1) Realistic 
time frames, 2) Reorganization of the armed forces/creation of a new unified army, 3) 
Regional approach to weapons control, 4) The role of the UN, and 5) Power-sharing. 
Following the analysis of each DDR process I will present the findings in a table. 
 
The nature of the conflict 
In 2002 after 27 years of war Angola was ranked as 161 out of 173 countries in the UNDP`s 
Human Development Index (UNDP, 2002). In order to set the scene, “no other post-conflict 
situation has been faced with all the complexities and challenges of failed DDR processes in a 
war to peace transition scenario” (Porto et al. 2007: 33). In the wake of Angola’s protracted 
and long-lasting war, which left the country in ruins, the national economy had virtually 
collapsed, hundreds of thousands died and many more were indirectly affected. The 
infrastructure was shattered and a vast part of the country was inaccessible for the 
humanitarian agencies.  The government system was highly unaccountable and a demoralized 
and traumatized civil society was left to start rebuilding the country (Ibid). As a consequence, 
by the end of 2002 Angola was a humanitarian catastrophe of unseen proportions. According 
to estimates by the UN, the total cost for the humanitarian operation was as much as $ 233 
million. (Ibid).  
 
The roots of the “modern” conflict go back to the early 1960s with the Angolan uprising 
against a white (Portuguese) colonial minority. The Angolans were used as “slave” labour for 
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the exploitation of their own natural resources. The white minority confiscated most of the 
arable land and this was the reason for the struggle for independence and liberation and the 
upsurge of nationalist movements, namely The Union for the Total Liberation of Angola 
(UNITA), the National Front for the liberation of Angola (FNLA) and the Popular Movement 
for the liberation of Angola (MPLA) (Accord, 2005). 
 
Throughout the post-WW II era the nationalist movements grew stronger, they developed 
guerrilla tactics and shaped their ideologies, which also separated them politically. The armed 
attack on a Luanda prison in 1961 has been celebrated as the beginning of the armed struggle 
for independence that lasted for fourteen years; the MPLA has ever since claimed it was their 
responsibility.  
 
In January 1975 the colonial power Portugal and the three parties (MPLA, FNLA and 
UNITA) met in Alvor Portugal to sign an agreement that granted Angola her independence 
and a handover of power to a transitional government. Shortly before the declaration of the 
independent state in September 1975 the largest parties, the MPLA and UNITA, had installed 
themselves in the capital, Luanda. The announcement of independence saw the start of an 
inevitable power struggle that would last for almost three decades. The Alvor agreement 
provided for a transitional government, the creation of an integrated army, future elections 
and final independence, but the coalition government was functioning poorly as the members 
doubted each other’s commitment to the peace process. The relationship between the MPLA 
and the other movements was far from good. The MPLA excluded the FNLA and the UNITA 
from the capital and formed the government and declared independence with Agostinho Neto 
as President. Agostinho Neto was succeeded in 1979 by José Eduardo dos Santos. The Alvor 
agreement soon collapsed and the country descended into civil war (ICTJ, 2008).  
 
The MPLA established a one-party socialist regime, a “classical” Marxist-Leninist party; it 
suppressed the Catholic Church, private business and also the freely organized civil society. 
Over time the state became authoritarian, increasingly corrupt and more repressive. This led 
to increasing unease and an even stronger opposition against the authoritarian regime (Accord 
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no. 15, 2004). As Meijer has observed, the roots of the conflict reveals a long history of 
rivalry, mutual exclusion, one-party rule and authoritarianism. Financially the MPLA 
government had good revenues from oil and diamonds plus foreign income in order to finance 
the war against the UNITA and to fund the growing lifestyle of the elite (Meijer, 2004). 
With the intensified war and UNITA’s occupation of parts of the countryside and the east and 
south of Angola the government and no access to vast parts of the country. This eventually 
became a problem and, lacking opportunities, many migrated to the cities in search of better 
prospects. Luanda during this time grew to an estimated population of four million (Accord 
no. 15, 2004). At the height of the war more than four million people were internally 
displaced and more than 450,000 fled across the borders to Namibia, Zambia and Congo. Out 
of a total of 13.1 million Angolans, they made up almost one fourth of the population (Porto 
et.al, 2007). 
 
Foreign interests 
Between 1970 and 1980 the Soviet Union and the US became increasingly more involved in 
Angola, not that they had specific interest in Angola but more as a war by proxy. The Soviet 
Union supported the MPLA and the United States supported UNITA. This changed during the 
1990s when the US became more dependent on the oil off Angola’s coast. According to 
Stedman (1997), when the Angolan war was at its height, the country’s oil accounted for 
between 11 to 12 per cent of USA’s oil needs in 1997. This marks an important shift in the 
US policy, from a cold war era geo-political rivalry to a more economically driven interest in 
the war. The US actually changed “horses” and ceased both its covert and overt support to 
UNITA to the benefit of the MPLA Government. According to Wikipedia, in the early 1960 
Fidel Castro had began his “Second Revolution” attempting to bring Marxism – Leninism to 
the African continent. His first failed attempt was Zaire, and then Castro went to have contact 
with UNITA and Savimbi but negotiations stalled due to the fact that Savimbi did not aspire 
to a Communism and Castro ended up to have talks and future cooperation with the MPLA 
party. Castro wanted to assist the MPLA to overthrow the Portugeese colonial power, to aid 
this he ended ut with a toal of 50,000 Cuban troops. Cuban troops were was a great asset for 
the MPLA fighting the UNITA and its South African allies. The regional support for UNITA 
came from Zaire (now the Democratic Republic of Congo) and South Africa, and the MPLA 
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had support from Congo-Brazzaville. South Africa at that time had borders with Angola 
(before Namibia became independent) and therefore had special interests in the conflict from 
a security point of view. A US brokered agreement in 1989, the New York Accord, resulted in 
the withdrawal of all foreign troops, the creation of an independent Namibian state and paved 
the way for the first Angolan peace process in the Bicesse Accords in 1991, followed by the 
Lusaka Protocol in 1994 and the Luenda Memorandum of Understanding in 2002. The UN 
with a small team of military monitors would monitor (UNAVEM I) the withdrawal of the 
South African and Cuban troops (US Dep. State, 2008). 
 
4.2 The	  Bicesse	  Accords	  –	  “Peace	  through	  elections”	  
 
The Bicesse Peace Accords signed in May 1991 at Bicesse in Portugal was the first 
comprehensive peace agreement between the government of Angola (MPLA) and the 
UNITA. Officially the talks started a year ahead in April 1990 under the auspices and heavy 
involvement of the Troika (Portugal, USA and USSR). The Troika put itself in the driving 
seat of the process and left the UN in an observer status. From the outset UNITA wanted the 
UN to be present with a strong mandate, but the MPLA, on the other hand, reluctantly 
accepted a role for the UN. The MPLA saw the UN as an intrusive infringement of its 
sovereignty. The peace accord forced the MPLA to adopt a multi-party system and hold 
elections after a transition period of eighteen months, during which the two forces were to be 
demilitarized and form a new unified army. The MPLA would remain the legal government 
and make preparations for the upcoming elections. The UNITA was probably too certain to 
win the election and had rejected to form any coalition government with the MPLA. A 
coalition government could have avoided the “winner takes all” outcome and might have 
contributed to trust-building and established transitory political rules (Messiant, 2004).  
 
A tripartite structure was established to monitor and verify the process 1) The Joint Military 
and Political Commission (CCPM), composed of the Government, UNITA and the Troika 
(Portugal, Russia and the United States), but the Troika had only status as observers. 2) The 
Joint Verification and Monitoring Commission (CMVF) and 3) the Joint Commission on the 
Formation of the Angolan Armed Forces (CCFA).  
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The CCPM was the overarching body of the entire joint monitoring body at all levels, full 
members were only those of the government and the UNITA and decisions were to be taken 
by consensus. It was clear from the beginning that neither of the parties had any intention to 
abandon its search for hegemony and was not interested in democratization or reconciliation. 
The UNITA joined the peace process to win the forthcoming election, which it was certain to 
win, to achieve state power. 
An important clause in the Bicesse Accords was the agreement by the parties to refrain from 
acquiring arms during the peace process, the so-called “triple zero” clause. This also meant 
that the “good friends” of the two, the US and the Soviet also would cease to supply arms.  
 
Within 60 days, The Bicesse Peace Accords planned to quarter an estimated 200,000 soldiers 
(on both sides) and create a new strong army of 50,000 men. It is however worth noting the 
scale and vast numbers of soldiers to demobilize, which is often overlooked and must have 
created an enormous task to accomplish in just 60 days! The new Angolan Armed Forces 
(FAA) would consist of 20,000 soldiers from both sides (15,000 soldiers, 3,000 non-
commissioned officers, and 2,000 officers), and an additional 6,000 for the Air Force and 
4,000 for the Navy (the strengths to be decided at a later stage), the surplus UNITA and 
government troops would be demobilized (Porto et al., 2007). Regarding the creation of the 
new army, the Bicesse Accords stated the following: “The process of formation of the Armed 
Forces shall begin with the entry into force of the ceasefire and end on the date of the 
elections, and shall evolve simultaneously with the assembly, disarmament and integration 
into civilian life of the troops being demobilized” (Accord 15, 2004:69). 
 
The first multi-party elections would be held in September 1992, after the creation of the new 
FAA army. “By the time the elections are held, only the FAA shall exist; there may be no 
other troops whatsoever. All members of the present armed forces of each party who do not 
become members of the FAA shall be demobilized prior to the holding of elections” (Accord 
no. 15, 2004: 69). 
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Analysis of the Bicesse DDR process 
In the following I will analyze the Bicesse DDR process with reference to the criteria or 
factors that are perceived as important for determining the success or failure of DDR 
processes. 
 
Realistic time frames 
Messiant notes that the Bicesse peace process was very much like other accords at that time: a 
transitional period followed by an electoral process with the objective of democratization of 
the political institutions (Messiant, 2004). But none of the parties were really interested in 
democracy: only military victory and hegemonic power would be the ultimate goals of the 
deadly pursuit. Porto et al. note that demobilization did not start until one year after and was 
progressing very slowly; only 61 per cent of the troops were quartered by February 1992 
(Porto et al. 2007). The ambitions for a quick DDR were not realistic seen in the light of that 
many soldiers on both sides. This may have been caused by inadequate planning and 
implementation, but also due to the fact that none of the parties trusted each other to give up 
their military strengths. Stedman notes that later that spring in May 1992 only 6,000 had been 
demobilized (Stedman, 1997). It is important to emphasize that quartering and demobilization 
is not the same. According to the 2006 IDDRS Operational Guide the ex-combatants normally 
spend a few months in the quartering areas as they go through the transition phase in order to 
be demobilized. This has changed in recent times and now demobilization it only 5-10 days at 
the maximum. However the length depends again on the context, the security situation and 
terms of the peace agreement (Steenken, personal communication, 19 August 2011). 
 
Porto et al observed that among the reported problems was the “head count” (registration); the 
first estimated figures during the peace talks were highly inflated (Porto et al. 2007). This 
may have been due to tactical, strategic or political reasons. Leaders on both sides 
exaggerated how many troops they had to mount pressure on the other party during the peace 
talks. This phenomenon of inflation is, however, a strategy not unknown during DDR 
processes (Ibid). Furthermore, Porto et al. have noted that UNITA claimed its force to be 
75,000, but a lot of the soldiers who showed up at the quartering areas were under-aged and 
also unarmed (Ibid). A probable cause may be that UNITA saved their best men and weapons 
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for a later stage. Even though demobilization packages were handed out, including money 
(five months salary) and clothing kit, there were reports that a number of troops had “auto -
demobilized” after registration (Porto et al., 2007). Registration is important for the individual 
because if the ex-combatant does not register and is handed the special “Demobilization card” 
he /she is not entitled to certain demobilization benefits like reinsertion kits (food, clothes and 
such).  
Porto et al. also discovered that as many as 12,000 soldiers had gone missing from October 
1991 to February 1992. Those “auto -demobilized “ were believed to have left because of lack 
of pay and food supplies in the camps (Ibid). According to IDDRS Operational Guide the 
standards of living should be acceptable, but if the standards in the quartering area are too 
high the combatants may be reluctant to leave after discharge (IDDRS, 2006:152). Porto et al. 
state that many of those who “auto-demobilised” never handed in their weapons (Ibid).  A lot 
of weapons that were unaccounted for would thereby be circulating among the population. If 
attached to ex-combatants the weapons could pose a threat to security and to the entire peace 
process. On the other hand, weapons could be sold or used in other conflicts.  A well planned 
disarmament programme with the support of the UN and other organizations could have 
prevented the proliferation of weapons. Messisant argues that the UN with its very limited 
resources and capacity did not have the possibility to adequately oversee and verify the 
implementation of the DDR process (Messiant, 2004).  Porto et al. note that banditry and 
crime by government ex-soldiers were also reported in the surrounding area of the camps 
(Porto et al., 2007). These security problems could have been avoided if UN has had the 
mandate and troops available. This was another example of many shortcomings of the Bicesse 
process. Time for proper planning and allocation of resources to assist in the quartering areas 
are important with such a large amount of troops to be quartered. 
Porto et al. found that by the time of the election in September1992, the parties had revised 
their troops' strengths to a total of 151,930; and the UNITA had demobilized 10,402 troops 
out of 25,000 scheduled. The government had demobilized 123,887 troops (Porto et. al 
2007:43). As Stedman notes, this had upset the balance of power between the parties. The 
UNITA used the time to reorganize and build up its military strength. During the cantonment 
phase UNITA had maintained its discipline, was unified and could be mobilized quickly. The 
government forces on the other hand had suffered a decline in their fighting morale and there 
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were episodes of drunkenness (Stedman, 1997). All in all this can be viewed as a shift in 
military balance to the benefit of UNITA.  
 
The Bicesse Accords had provisions for Disarmament and Demobilization and Reintegration 
of both the MPLA and the UNITA into the new FAA army. Plans and provisions for the 
reintegration of the ex-combatants into civilian life were poorly addressed in the accords. 
Because the reintegration phase may last between two to three years, planning of this phase 
should have been addressed earlier to attract possible donors. Since reintegration is the most 
time-consuming part of the program it should have been outlined in the early stages in the 
peace accords (School for a Culture of Peace, 2006). Porto et al. note that the Inter-ministerial 
Office to Support the Demobilized Military of Angola (GIAMDA) was created in November 
1991to implement the reintegration and assist structures developed for social and vocational 
reintegration in the communities. Although up to $447 million were allocated to the 
reintegration program, it was never implemented because the peace process crumbled (Porto 
et. al 2003). According to the FBA the momentum must be kept during the DDR process, 
when DDR is not planned correctly, one loses the momentum and the possible strengths this 
political and stabilizing process may have. From a DDR perspective one may therefore say 
that the provisions for “DDR” were addressed, but when it came to specific planning and 
implementation the process failed. The time frame as noted by Messiant (2004) was 
unrealistic, too rigid and resulted in a situation where DDR was not accomplished before the 
election date. This was also the case in Mozambique, but in Mozambique the UN postponed 
the elections when military and political conditions for holding an election were not met 
(Ibid). 
 
Reorganization of the armed forces/creation of a new unified army 
The Bicesse Accords specifically addressed the formation of a new unified army by 
reintegrating an equal amount of troops from both the MPLA and the UNITA. However, 
according to de Beer and Gamba only 8,800 out of the planned 40,000 soldiers had reported 
to the FAA the day before the election (de Beer and Gamba, 2000). Furthermore, the Bicesse 
Accords stated that it was the CCPM that would be responsible for the overall political 
supervision of the ceasefire process, and its decisions would be made by consensus. This 
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meant that the two parties alone were responsible for upholding the peace accord! When the 
progress of the integration of the new Army did not meet the time frames, the parties 
improvised and nominally created the FAA. Just prior to the election in 1992 the UN Special 
Representative Margaret Anstee’s analysis of the situation gave a grim prospect: “…by the 
time of the election there were now three armies spread around, lots of unregistered weapons 
among the civil population, decline in law and order and slow progress in extending the 
central administration…” (Porto et al. 2007:43). Important to note is that when the war broke 
out again, the MPLA and the government forces were now the same: namely the FAA. The 
FAA grew stronger and as de Beer and Gamba states, “according to the FAA commander 
General Joâo de Matos, by the end of 1993 the FAA had grown to 85,000 troops and more 
were in training” (de Beer and Gamba, 2000:14).  The elections should instead have been 
postponed to allow for the completion of the reorganization of the FAA. Reorganizing of the 
army as a tool for security sector reform is important for both sides in the conflict; it is 
important for the military balance that both parties are equally present in a new army. Another 
factor is that it lays the ground for short- and long-term stability through reconciliation 
between the two forces. This was yet another example that the elections were the goal for the 
Bicesse peace accords. 
 
The regional approach to disarmament and weapons control 
The “triple zero” clause mentioned in the peace accord, affirming that the Troika should 
refrain from distributing arms, was an important achievement that could have had a 
preventive role in the arms race between the two parties. The accords stated specifically that 
the US and the USSR should refrain from supporting the parties with arms, but no less 
important was that they should encourage other countries do so as well (Accord no. 15, 
2004). The first part of the clause pertaining to the direct supply of arms from the US and the 
Soviet Union was believed to be followed, at least officially. The last part concerning the 
regional approach, “…encourage other countries to do so as well…” did not come into effect 
until after 1998, as will be discussed later in this chapter. 
On the one hand, to monitor the process there was the UN, that neither had the resources to 
enforce weapons control nor any impact on trust-building. On the other hand, there was the 
international community (the Troika), which turned a blind eye. 
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According to Messiant (2004), disarmament proceeded slowly because both armies were 
reluctant to hand in weapons. A reason for this was that neither side was in earnest nor trusted 
the other. According to Stedman, both parties kept small secret armies, a clear violation of the 
peace accord, and there were rumours that UNITA had secretly hidden away some armed 
battalions in neighbouring Zaire, with a plan to use them if they needed to mount a rapid 
strike offensive (Stedman, 1997). Another example, according to de Beer and Gamba, was 
when UNITA secured the important oil town Soyo, a diamond rich area in the north- east in 
1993, the government therefore found it necessary to hire a South African private military 
company to strike back (de Beer and Gamba, 2000). As noted by Steenken, as a proof of 
UNITAS control in several rural areas, the UNITA sent farmers to be demobilized and kept 
their soldiers back in the fields and thereby undermined the whole DDR and peace process. 
From this and similar experiences the DDR program did not have any effect: the international 
community did not take the regional approach to weapons control seriously. Regional 
weapons control could have prevented the influx of weapons that made it possible for the 
parties to continue rearming their troops. On the other hand according to Steenken, it is 
almost impossible to enforce control over porous borders, especially with such marginal 
reources allocated (Steenken, personal communication, 19 August 2011). 
 
Regarding disarmament, Porto et al. identified a concern with the disarmament procedures. 
When the soldiers came with their weapons to the collection point, the UN would verify and 
sign documents for the proof of disarmament. With regard to storing and collection of arms 
the Bicesse peace Accords never instructed a double key system (one key kept locally by the 
local commander and one with the UN) (Porto et al., 2007). As a consequence, verifying the 
disarmament was difficult since the weapons store could easily be opened and weapons  
stolen and recycled back to uphold the war machinery. Porto et al. also identified another 
problem that was emerging: many government troops who “self-demobilised” (i.e. left the 
units without joining the DDR process) kept their weapons and did not officially disarm. Due 
to the unsecured structures, weapons were circulating and there was a rise in crime and 
banditry (Ibid). On the individual level a lot of soldiers kept their weapons, due to the low 
level of security and that they probably hoped they could be sold at a later stage. 
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De Beer and Gamba stipulate the total disarmament to include some 34,425 weapons; 97 
percent were personal or light crew weapons, and 30-40 per cent were unserviceable (de Beer 
and Gamba, 2000). These findings indicate that the parties were hardly serious in complying 
with the disarmament process. The heavy guns were kept away for future use, which again 
undermined the whole peace process. Other initiatives that should have been dealt with in the 
peace accords were the development of a national disarmament plan to prevent new hostilities 
and banditry. The aim is to reduce general criminal activity and possible spoilers of the peace 
process. A more comprehensive approach on security would have been a significant factor for 
post conflict stability during the transitional phase. Unresolved issues have a tendency to be 
solved with bullets rather than diplomacy. As pointed out above, a comprehensive approach 
towards disarmament was not taken seriously during the Bicesse Accords. The parties did not 
reduce their arms; instead they acquired more. The international community (the US and the 
USSR/Russia) with most to say did not instruct their allies nor the regional organizations to 
take disarmament seriously. Stedman (1997) argues for the possibility that if Savimbi had not 
been able to maintain his military strength in October 1992 and the international community 
had held back their arms supply, he might have been brought back to the peace track. This 
just underscores the importance of the regional and international factor in the DDR process. 
The arms race could go on because violation of the peace accord was not punished. 
 
The role of the UN 
Institutionally the The Bicesse peace accords established a verification and monitoring 
commission (CMVF) to oversee and verify the process. The UN was invited to assist in the 
monitoring and verification process. The UN played a very marginal role and was not 
involved until the very end of the negotiations. The Accords stated:  “The UN will be invited 
to send monitors to support the Angolan parties at the request of the Government of the 
People’s Republic of Angola (GPRA) (Accord no. 15, 2004:69). 
 
According to Porto et al. the signatories to the Bicesse Accord (MPLA and UNITA) decided 
to allow for a UN Verification Mission (UNAVEM I January 1989- May 1991); first, to 
verify the withdrawal of 50,000 Cuban troops that came to assist the MPLA during the 1970s 
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and 1980s, as agreed during the New York Accords (1989). Secondly, the UN Secretary-
General proposed an extended mandate to also verify the ceasefire and neutrality of the 
Angolan Police under the Bicesse Accords. The New York principles, signed in New York in 
December 1988 between Angola, South Africa and Cuba, were negotiated by the US. It called 
for a withdrawal of all Cuban troops from Angola and cooperation and abstention from 
violent action between Angola and South Africa for the creation of an independent Namibia. 
Noted by Steenken, UNAVEM I thereby became a success, it monitored the withdrawal of 
foreign troops. A side effect was that it also clearly reduced the effectiveness of the MPLA, 
because it had lost its support from the Cuban troops (Steenken, personal communication, 19 
August 2011).  Porto et al, note that eventually the UNAVEM II`s mandate became to 
observe and verify the elections and oversee the implementation of the different aspects of the 
Bicesse Accords (Porto et al., 2007). Because of its limitation in resources, only $132m for a 
seventeen-month mission and staff of only 350 military observers and 260 Police observers, 
the UNAVEM II could not intervene in any of the violations and was strictly limited in doing 
their job during the process because of its mandate. As a result the compliance of the peace 
accord hung solely upon the two parties alone. The UN Special Representative for Angola 
Margaret Anstee stated “…UNAVEM II was a misguided exercise in peace-keeping 
minimalism.” (Porto et al., 2007: 42). The UNAVEM II was not involved during the initial 
peace talks or the planning of the DDR process, but was later mandated to observe and verify 
the elections and oversee the implementation of the peace accords. The electoral process was 
organized and directed by the National Electoral Council (NEC) where all organized parties 
where represented. One can ask why the UN allowed itself to be involved in such a mission. 
Maybe it actually believed that the two parties could come to an agreement after the election 
where they would accept the results and bury their hatchets. On the other hand, there was 
possibly a misunderstood perception of what the UN could do. Maybe the UN was too 
credulous in believing that the parties would comply when the “mighty UN” monitored them. 
 
Another question is whether a well-quipped and resourceful UN could have secured the peace 
after the 1992 elections. The answer is probably not. Even if the UN had more resources to 
monitor and verify, the outcome would probably not have been different. The key issue was 
that both parties were too determined to win and not give up their hegemony. Stedman notes 
that the UN monitors from January to September 1992 reported over sixteen cease-fire 
violations which all of them could have escalated into full-scale war. This time, as Stedman 
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notes, the parties were so determined to proceed with the elections that they ignored each 
others’ violations (Stedman, 1997). The motivation and will of the parties is a crucial factor 
for the success of the peace process. These cease-fire violations had, as Stedman notes, the 
potential to restart the war, but when the parties could gain “something” (secure their position 
through an election victory), they were determined to continue the peace process. 
 
Power-sharing 
Messiant notes that the aim of the Bicesse peace process was to stop the fighting and end  
one-party Marxist-Leninist rule by adopting a new multi-party system (Messiant, 2004). 
Stedman states that during the transition period both the parties had been urged to form a 
transitional government (Stedman, 1997). A transitional government could have started 
political talks and helped the democratic process and created trust between the parties. 
However, from the outset neither of the two parties wanted any reconciliation or 
democratization. Stedman has noted that prior to the peace accords the MPLA had been under 
great pressure to join the process and had no intention of giving up its power (Stedman, 
1997). The MPLA was in power and knew that UNITA was strong militarily and was unsure 
of how the election would turn out, and therefore it was probably not in the MPLA`s interest 
to risk the vote. UNITA, on the other hand, had joined the peace talks because they were 
certain of winning the elections. Democratisation or not as Messiant has noted, none of them 
was probably interested in a democratic process; securing their hegemony was their only 
interest (Messiant, 2004). According to Spears (2005), a statement by Jonas Savimbi prior to 
the elections shows how confident he was to win the elections “If I lose the elections, this is 
my country and I am an ordinary citizen. No one will push me to go back to the bush 
anymore” (Noel et al. 2005:193). Savimbi did not keep his word when he lost the election. 
His actions in the post-election period also undermined the efforts of any possible power-
sharing. 
 
As stated by Margaret Anstee, the UN`s Special Representative to Angola “[…] power-
sharing might have helped bring an end to Angola’s ongoing violence”, but the then 
Namibian prime minister replied: “Then you want second-class democracy for Africa! In the 
UK one party wins and governs, the others lose and don’t and that is the way it should be. 
That is the way here” (Noel et al., 2005:187). These two statements only confirm that there is 
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no quick fix to a long rooted conflict where the conflict is not right or ripe for solution and 
both leaders stand apart and distrust is so overwhelming.  
 
Vines and Oruitemeka have studied the dynamics and politics during the transition phase and 
state that the UNITA was afraid that it could lose credit with the voters by taking 
responsibility in a pre-election government that it feared would fail.  Furthermore, Vines and 
Oruitemeka note that the election campaign was fought along ethnic lines. Jonas Savimbi 
tried during his campaigns in the rural areas to win supporters with the aim of alienating what 
he called the “corrupt, urban Afro-Portuguese” MPLA government, in contrast to UNITA, 
that was a “non corrupt genuinely rural-based party” (Vines and Oruitemeka, 2009:200). In 
retrospect, this changed the face of the conflict from power to ethnically based and these 
above mentioned reasons might all have aided the return to war. 
 
The two sides maintained the status quo during the transition period: none of the sides were 
interested in disarming, or leaving occupied territory. Porto et al. note that during the 
transition period, the MPLA had access to funds, control over media, state administration and 
had the resources to mobilize the electorate so they could secure the vote. The US and 
UNITA on the other side just wanted a quick peace process and had pushed forward to set an 
early date for the elections (Porto et al., 2007). In hindsight it was probably a mistake by the 
UNITA to let the MPLA have full access and use all the state’s resources during the election 
campaign. According to Porto et al., Edoardo dos Santos from the MPLA party won the 
presidential election by 49, 7 per cent vs. Savimbi 40 per cent, and a second round was 
required. The UNITA also lost the legislative election to the MPLA by a clear vote (UNITA 
34 per cent and MPLA 54 per cent) (Ibid). There was no trust among the parties: when the 
election results were announced on 17 October 1992, Savimbi had already put his army on 
marching orders (de Beer and Gamba, 2000). Savimbi had rejected the election results and 
called them fraudulent. However, the UN and its observers labelled the election “free and 
fair” (Christine Messiant, 2004; Accord no. 15, 2004:19). According to the UN, the UNITA 
had early claimed the elections fraudulent with allegations of wiedspread and massive 
systematic irregularities. The NEC responded to this by sending investigators along with UN 
representatives to all 18 provinces, but did not find any conclusive evidence of systematic and 
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massive fraud and thereby the elections were considered to have been generally ”free and 
fair” (UN/UNAVEM II, 2000). 
During the Bicesse Accords the goal was to make peace through democracy (change “bullets” 
for “ballots”!). But when the wrong party won the election (the MPLA instead of the UNITA) 
democracy and peace collapsed and was followed by another “penalty lap” – civil war. 
UNITA refused to play the “democracy game” when it lost the first round, thereby 
overturning the whole gaming table and returning to the “old civil war game”, which it still 
hoped to “win”. The price UNITA had to pay was loss of legitimacy “symmetry” to the 
MPLA. UNITA lost legitimacy because they were bad losers who staged an armed rebellion. 
A mistake by the Troika was not to have had a contingency plan to manage or prevent the 
outbreak of new hostilities when Savimbi decided to go back to war. An important question 
that should have been asked was: what would Savimbi do if he lost the elections? Stedman 
notes that just prior to the election, as late as the summer of 1992 the US was almost certain 
that UNITA would win. They were worried that the MPLA would not accept electoral defeat 
and throw the peace process into a crisis (Stedman, 1997). This actually shows that the Troika 
and particularly the US did not have any contingency plan to deal with the situation that 
brought Angola back into a new war.  According to Messiant, the Troika later admitted that 
they lacked a good understanding of the political situation between the two sides (Messiant, 
2004). On the same basis one can also state that a “winner takes all” contest was never a 
unifying strategy for lasting peace.  
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Sub-conclusions from the Bicesse DDR process 
The Bicesse Accord had good intentions: to open up for multiparty elections and integrate the 
two armies into a new unified national army. However, the path for disarmament and 
demobilization was long and winding and did not proceed as planned. The most important 
milestone, the creation of a unified national army scheduled to be operational before the 
election was not accomplished. UNITA had reported fewer than fifty percent of its troops to 
the FAA. The FAA was nominally created a day ahead of the election and on Election Day 
the worst nightmare unfolded - there were now not one but three armies scattered around. The 
result was catastrophic. Savimbi could not tolerate the outcome of the election and set aside 
the result, calling it fraudulent, and went back to the old war game. He could do this because 
his army was still intact and the stake was too high to settle for a second place. The timing 
was probably not even right; everything was rushed ahead and there was no political process 
prior to the election and the few seeds for democratization did not have any place to grow.  
A regional approach to weapons control and disarmament of the wider community was a 
major issue during the Angolan civil war. Both the parties had enough reserves in oil and 
diamonds to continue the arms race. Despite the “triple zero” clause, both armies managed to 
acquire arms through regional channels. The borders were “leaking” and the understaffed UN 
could do nothing about it, there were no mandate or resources by the UN to enforce violations 
of the peace accord. With hindsight, one can on the one hand blame the set up of the DDR 
process for having had too unrealistic and rigid time frames to adjust the election date when 
progression stalled. On the other hand, Savimbi’s ultimate goal was the same anyhow: to win 
either politically or on the battlefield. The last but not least important of the criteria, power-
sharing, was non-existent. A winner takes all approach was not unifying, nor did the Troika 
involve itself in breaches of the peace accord. Sanctions for violations were not addressed by 
the international community and the Troika only turned a blind eye. Table 4.1 sums up the 
Bicesse peace process in terms of our five analytical criteria. 
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Bicesse DDR process from 1991-1992 
Key criteria considered important for successful 
peace/DDR processes 
Result of the DDR process with analysis 
 
Realistic timeframes Unrealistic. Too rigid, not flexible enough to meet 
deadline for election 
Reorganization of the armed forces/creation of a 
new unified army  
Not successful. UNITA only reintegrated 50% of 
its combatants into the new FAA. FAA was only 
nominally created a day ahead the elections. 
Regional approach to weapons control No regional approach, “Triple zero” clause not 
effective. Proliferation of arms through cross-
border. 
The role of the UN The UN was not part of the negotiations of the 
peace accords and UNAVEM II was too 
understaffed to be influential. The UN could do 
nothing but acknowledge that the peace process 
collapsed. 
 Power- sharing No provision for trust-building power-sharing 
through a government of national unity 
Table 4.1 Analysis of the Bicesse DDR process 
 
 
4.3 The	  Lusaka	  Protocol	  –	  “Peace	  through	  power	  sharing”	  
 
According to Stedman, when fighting resumed, both the MPLA and the UNITA had been 
under constant international pressure to resume talks. Ending the war was important to ease 
the burden of the Angolan people. During the year after the collapse of the Bicesse peace 
process, another 300,000 Angolans were killed. On the one hand, the UNITA was pushed to 
the negotiating table by the South African foreign minister Pik Botha, who unilaterally 
presented a peace plan with the formation of a government of national unity and a plan to set 
the date for new elections. Furthermore, Stedman notes that at the same time the US also 
understood that power-sharing had to be the key to reconciliation and tried to press the MPLA 
on the other side (Stedman, 1997). As Messiant notes, also the Abidjan Protocol by mid-1993 
was rejected by the UNITA. This can be viewed against UNITA’s military superiority, as 
Messiant further states (Messiant, 2004). UNITA did not have anything to gain by going back 
to the negotiation table; it saw its military capabilities as powerful enough to defeat the 
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MPLA. However, as Messiant observes, times changed, particularly when support was 
withdrawn from its biggest ally, the US. By mid-1993 the US withdrew its support and 
recognized MPLA (hereafter the government or MPLA government will be used 
interchangeably) as the legitimate winner of the 1992 election. This opened up for UN 
sanctions and prohibition of providing arms to UNITA (Messiant 2004).  Support from the 
US throughout the war had played a crucial role for UNITA during the negotiations, but also 
by attempting to destabilize the government by its economic embargo (Centre for 
International Cooperation and Security, 2008). According to Messiant, as a consequence of 
reduced revenues and military fortunes, UNITA in October 1993 issued a communiqué 
reaffirming the validity of the Bicesse Accords. This communiqué paved the way for new 
talks and on 15 November 1994 in Lusaka, Zambia, after a series of military setbacks, 
UNITA was now forced to sign the peace accord. The UN Special Representative, Alioune 
Blondin Beye, facilitated the talks. The UN’s status as facilitator and mandate was now 
secured and put the UN in a crucial role in the process; the UN led the negotiations for the 
first time. The most important aspect of this peace accord was that the vanquished party 
should have a place in power and the armed factions involved should not have the means to 
change the course of the events (Messiant, 2004).  This meant that the DDR process had to be 
taken seriously by the parties, the donors and the UN.  
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According to the Lusaka Protocol, these were the agendas for the Angola peace talks between 
the Government and UNITA: 
Box 4.1: Agendas for the Angola peace talks between the Government and UNITA during the Lusaka Protocol 
 
Politically the Lusaka Protocol did take into consideration many of the shortcomings of the 
Bicesse process by avoiding a “winner takes all” solution.  Messiant has identified that the 
time frames were more flexible, and a power-sharing system was agreed upon by both parties 
to form a Government of Unity and National Reconciliation (GURN). UNITA had now lost 
its legitimate “symmetry” as a political rival to the MPLA government and was considered a 
rebel. As a consequence UNITA was the only party to be demobilized and disarmed. In fact, 
in order to participate in the government UNITA now had to show proof of disarmament. The 
important “triple zero” clause forbidding the parties to re-arm was not part of the Lusaka 
Protocol itself, just repeated in an annex (Messiant, 2004).  
To oversee and implement the DDR process, a new body, the Institute for the Socio- 
Professional Reintegration of Ex- Military Personnel (IRSEM) was created. IRSEM was 
responsible for a number of activities such as vocational training, infrastructure, community 
resettlement and micro-credit, although its impact has been minimal (Porto et al., 2007: 44). 
 
1) Military issues:  
a. Re-establishment of the cease-fire;  
b. Withdrawal, quartering and demilitarization of all UNITA military forces including 
integration of UNITA generals into the government armed forces;  
c. Disarmament of civilians;  
d. Completion of the formation of the Angolan Armed Forces (FAA), including demobilization;   
  
2) The Police: Incorporation of 5,500 UNITA troops into the Angolan National Police; 
 
3) United Nations’ mandate, the role of the Observers of the Peace Accords and the Joint Commission; 
 
4) National reconciliation; 
 
5) Completion of the electoral process and other pending issues. 
A Joint Commission was established with representatives from the Government, UNITA, the UN and the 
bserver countries (Conciliation resources, 1994). 
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Analysis of the Lusaka DDR process 
In the following I will analyze the Luena DDR process with reference to the criteria or factors 
that are perceived as important for determining the success or failure of DDR processes. 
 
Realistic time frames 
Messiant has noted that previous mistakes and shortcomings from the Bicesse Accords were 
planned to be solved through not so rigid timelines. As an example, the date for the second 
round of the presidential election was to be decided at a later stage (Messiant, 2004). The 
reason for this was that they wanted to complete disarmament and then decide when the 
second round of the presidential elections was to take place. UNITA had to show proof of 
disarmament first. The timetable and sequencing of activities were to be monitored by the 
UN. According to the Lusaka Protocol annex 9 “…no task shall be initiated until the previous 
one has been concluded, and that where conditions permit, the timetable can be brought 
forward by agreement between the Government and UNITA” (Conciliation resources, 
1994:75).  
 
According to Porto et al., the Lusaka Protocol signed on 15 November 1994 called for a 
minimum number 62,500 UNITA troops to be quartered. The quartering eventually begun in 
January 1995 but the demobilization did not commence until 1997. The Lusaka protocol 
planned for demobilization in two phases: the first phase included the under aged soldiers and 
the second phase concerned adult soldiers, but in practise they took place at the same time. 
According to Steenken, as result of these faults and lessons learned during the Lusaka DDR 
process the IDDRS Operational Guide took this into consideration when the 2006 guidelines 
were written. Children and adults should be separated. Children should immediately be sent to 
Interim Care Centres (ICC). In the ICC the children would then be unified with family 
members (IDDRS, 2006, Steenken, personal communication, 19 August 2011). The reason 
for this is that the children as soon as possible should break the ties with their commanders. 
There is a risk that the children may still seek cohesion and trust with their former 
commanders. Children may also have difficulties in understanding the meaning of the DDR 
programme and see it as a new mobilization.  
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Furthermore, as an improvement from the Bicesse Accords, the state administration was to be 
normalized before the demobilization started, but according to Porto et al., this was changed 
during revisions between 1996 and 1997 (Porto et al., 2007). The state administration and its 
institutions are important in order to cope with and plan the large amount of returnees to the 
communities.  Porto et al. have furthermore observed that in order to gather and disarm 
UNITA troops fifteen “Selection and Demobilisation centres” were established and run by the 
UNAVEM III. Still under the auspices of UNAVEM III the demobilization process went 
slowly; it was incomplete and involved only a few key UNITA troops. By the end of 1995 
UNITA chose to suspend its further participation in the process in protest against the 
government’s seizure of UNITA held territory. However, diplomatic talks in 1996 between 
the Portuguese President Soares and US Ambassador to the UN, Madeleine Albright, put 
pressure on the UNITA leader to proceed with the DDR process and increase the pace of 
quartering (Ibid).  
 
According to Porto et al., by December 1997 (during the two years of UNAVEM III), 78,886 
UNITA troops had been registered and quartered, of which 8,607 were under aged and 11,051 
disabled. Of these quartered (78,886), around 26,000 “deserted” from the programme. Half a 
year later in May 1998 almost 50,000 UNITA troops had been demobilized; 10,880 were 
incorporated into the FAA; 5,059 were under aged and 10,771 disabled (Porto et al., 
2007:45). Comparing the two DDR processes, the Bicesse DDR process managed to 
demobilize 10.402 soldiers (less than 50% of 25,000 eligible for demobilization) whereas the 
Lusaka DDR process demobilized 50,000 soldiers (75% of 76,360 eligible for 
demobilisation). However, even with greater “success” in demobilisation during the Lusaka 
process, UNITA was constantly interrupting and delaying the process, and reports emerged 
that UNITA was regrouping and forcibly recruiting through training camps in Jamba. A lot of 
soldiers were also reported missing, self-demobilized or deserted. Porto et al. stated that 
during the Bicesse DDR process some 12,000 deserted, and during the Lusaka DDR process 
some 26,000 soldiers deserted (Ibid). 
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Human Rights Watch was critical of the DDR program of the Lusaka process, saying it 
discriminated against the children, especially girls. Children under the age of seventeen who 
had fought during the war were denied some of the benefits of the adults, even though some 
of them carried out the same duties. The criticism that came up was that adult soldiers would 
receive reinsertion packages (reinsertion packages included ID cards for demobilized soldiers, 
five months’ salary, transport allowance for their return home), while many of the soldiers 
who were seventeen and younger were not eligible for these packages. Throughout the Lusaka 
DDR process as many as 9,000 boy soldiers from both sides were enrolled in the 
demobilization programme. However, the programme was only partially successful, since 
girls were not included in the programme. It was a mistake not to give the girls the same 
benefits as the boys. Child soldiers released from the FAA did not receive any benefits as 
former fighters. These young ex- combatants were placed back in the communities with their 
families and relatives with no assistance such as food, shelter or education programmes 
(Human Rights Watch, 2003). A common concern for both these groups was the uncertain 
future that they would face with their “back pack” of a violent history of psychological 
traumas. The need for counselling and community reintegration was therefore high. 
 
Porto et al., report that the resettlement and reintegration was a complex exercise for the 
government. It involved coordination with many agencies such as the UNITA, different UN 
agencies and NGOs and there were difficulties with coordination among them too. Initially 
when the soldiers presented themselves for registration (head count), they were asked where 
they wanted to resettle. After a while some UNITA soldiers wanted to change their 
destination of return. The FAA overruled this wish; “resettlement assistance was only a 
benefit not a right” For some this meant that they were not able to change their destination. 
The International Organization for Immigration (IOM) argued that many tried to change their 
destination and leave together with other UNITA ex-soldiers; the thought was that this could 
be a risk of new mobilization (Porto et al., 2007). Porto et al., note that there were also 
problems attached to the payment of special subsidies for assistance and reintegration 
(SEAR). Over half of the demobilized soldiers did not receive their second payment (60 per 
cent) and only a quarter (25 per cent) received their third payment. The office responsible for 
payment was also beset with mismanagement and fraud as stated by UNDP (Ibid).  Porto et 
al. also identify critiques and general shortcomings of the planning of the reintegration 
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process which did not take into consideration the different socio economic background of ex-
combatants. The reintegration programmes during the Lusaka process were developed from 
socioeconomic surveys conducted on FAA government soldiers during the Bicesse process 
(four years earlier) (Ibid). As a consequence the same profiling was used on UNITA soldiers. 
It is important to do the profiling during the planning phase of the operation in order to get a 
clear picture of the challenges and constraints the ex-combatants and the implementers for 
DDR programs may encounter. Another important reason in the cas of Angola was that the 
econmiy in the meantime had gone worse bcause of the war and therefore needs of the ex- 
combatants may had changed. Table 4.2 provides an overview of the FAA soldiers during the 
Lusaka process. When planning reintegration projects or issuing resettlement packages it is 
important to take into account their profile.  For the Government this meant that most of the 
ex-combatants were relatively young (26 years), came from rural areas; very few had any 
formal education; they came from large families and most of them want to be farmers.  
 
The first survey to cover both Government and UNITA soldiers was done as late as in 1995 
(Porto et al., 2007: 47).  
Age Average age: 26 years  
8% below 18 years, 
56% below 25 years 
 
Education 27% did not have any education, 
Only 12% had more than primary school (4th) grade, 
2% had more than 6th  
Family 
situation 
27% did not have families 
Average families: 6 people 
60% had three family members 
89% from rural areas  
 
Military 
service 
Average 8 years in the army (1/3 of the life of the soldier) 
55% were soldiers for more than 5 years 
Preferred 
occupation 
7% health technicians,  
40 % farmers,  
21% students, mechanics or carpenters,  
11 % motorists 
Table 4.2 Profile of a FAA soldier during the Lusaka Protocol (Porto et al., 2007:47) 
 
According to Porto et al. there were great plans for reintegration projects: the Community 
Counselling and Referral Service for Demobilized Soldiers (SeCor), the “Training for Self-
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Employment for Ex-Military Personnel from Angola (TSE)” and the “Community Based 
Quick Impact Project (QIP). Additionally there were plans for “working brigades” to keep 
people busy in heavy infrastructure labour on roads and bridges. The problem was that many 
of these plans never saw daylight; they were too expensive and politically sensitive. On the 
political side, Savimbi had refused having his men be degraded to manual labour by 
participating in the “working brigades”. On the other side, when the war broke out again all 
projects ceased (Porto et al., 2007). The UN IDDRS Operational Guide specifically turns the 
focus on individual reintegration so the ex-combatants can be engaged in micro projects to 
reduce the long-term security risk they present. The communities should be provided with 
tools and capacities to support reintegration. Important is also to reintegrate all groups in the 
community, not just the ex-combatants but also the IDPs, refugees, and other special groups 
(IDDRS, 2006: 161). When the war broke out again in late 1998 many ex-UNITA soldiers 
were still in the quartering camps with no real alternatives other than joining the war. If more 
reintegration projects had been materialized, many more ex-combatants could have had the 
chance to decide their own future. The Lusaka process allowed for a more flexible timeline 
than the Bicesse had, but according to Porto et al., UNITA, had as the government argued, 
taken advantage of the flexible time frames to regroup and rearm, (Ibid).  
 
Reorganization of the armed forces/creation of a new unified army  
According to the Lusaka Protocol, the formation of a unified army was important for several 
reasons; for reconciliation; the need to only have one single national non-partisan armed 
force. Verification and monitoring of the progress and compliance was under the UN 
mandate. The composition of the army would reflect the principle of proportionality between 
the Government and the UNITA’s armed forces, which was also agreed upon in the former 
Bicesse Accord (Reconciliation Resources, 1994).  
 
As Porto and de Beer noted, when the joint army was sworn in on 10 July 1996, 10,800 
UNITA troops had reported to service out of a total of some 25,000. Furthermore according to 
Porto et al., the process was compounded with difficulties: demobilization and formation of 
the joint army were taking place at the same time; simultaneously there were reports that 
UNITA was regrouping (Porto et al., 2007). 
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On the one hand, it is understandable that Savimbi would keep his units intact until his power 
was secured, for this he needed a strong army. On the other hand, it was a violation of the 
peace accords, but it did not seem that he was committed to the peace process anyway which 
again was a key problem to the whole process. According to the Lusaka Protocol 5,400 
UNITA troops were to be integrated into the National Police. Again according to the Lusaka 
Protocol annex 5, the National Police was intended to be “…a non-partisan institution, it 
should be an instrument for reinforcing national reconciliation” (Reconciliation Resources, 
1994: 73). One of the tasks for the National Police was to collect and store all armaments in 
the hands of civilians. The UN should oversee the verification. In retrospect it is estimated 
that the MPLA Government issued some 3-4 million weapons to the population at times of 
crises and this is still a problem today (Conciliation Resources, 2011).  
 
Regional approach to disarmament and weapons control 
As referred to by Messiant, a critical factor and prerequisite for the Lusaka peace process was 
the disarmament of UNITA. However, on the other hand, UNITA needed both political and 
economical guarantees before it could disarm. Because Savimbi thought the peace accord was 
unfair, he constantly violated the peace process. According to an UN official both parties 
notoriously rearmed and violated the Protocol: “ UNITA violated the agreement by day, the 
government by night” (Messiant, 2004).  
 
The so-called “triple zero” clause that had been important for the Bicesse Accord, even if not 
strictly adhered to, was not so prominent and not part of the Lusaka protocol itself. According 
to Messiant, there was nothing in the text prohibiting foreign countries from re-arming the 
“legitimate government”, but it constituted a real breach for UNITA while it was no longer a 
problem for the government, at least not in legal terms…” (Ibid). 
However, Annex 3 of the Lusaka Protocol specifies that, “…military forces cannot receive 
any military equipment, lethal or otherwise...” (Reconciliation Recources, 1994:73). De Beer 
and Gamba state that despite this “[…] the Soviet Union and Portugal sold military equipment 
to the Angolan government while the United States was widely suspected of covertly funding 
UNITA[..]” (de Beer and Gamba, 2000:83). 
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Because the parties had abandoned the “triple zero clause”, tanks and heavy weapon were 
believed to come in from both sides. Furthermore, as observed by de Beer and Gamba, the 
government purchased over one hundred infantry fighting vehicles and spent over US$ 300 
million on fighter aeroplanes, helicopters, missiles and a variety of ammunitions. These 
purchases arrived from Russia, France, Brazil, and Switzerland and were possible with cash 
from its oil revenues (Ibid).  As the Small Arms Survey noted, in 1993 UNITA was under UN 
sanctions, but could still acquire arms through illicit channels. The “Fowler report” stated in 
the “Small Arms Survey” (2001) submitted to the UN Security Council, that UNITA bought 
firearms from Bulgaria through a South African arms dealer, Ronnie De Decker in the early 
1990s. The deal was worth some US$ 4-5 million. From the mid-1990s arms could be bought 
through the then president Mobutu Sese Seko of Zaire (now Democratic Republic of Congo). 
Zaire and Angola share borders and arms easily crossed them. UNITA purchased its rocket 
launchers and surface-to-air missile system from Ukraine and Bulgaria. UNITA’s Arms deals 
were financed by the sale of diamonds, yet no sanctions took place on these contries. (Small 
Arms Survey, 2001: chapter 5). 
When the first combatants entered the assembly areas, it became clear that the protocol 
obligations were not going to be fulfilled.  Weapons that were handed in were also 
unserviceable and in poor condition. UNITA did not hand in any heavy weapons and was 
maintaining its arms supply (Ibid). 
Porto et al., state that when the Bicesse peace process broke down, the government had issued 
weapons to “Ninjas” who were trained in non-standard policing practices supported by a civil 
defence initiative. Up to a million AK 47s were handed out in Luanda alone, and only few 
had been recovered (Porto et al., 2007). The Lusaka Protocol did take into consideration this 
challenge.   Annex 3 states that “[…] civilians should be disarmed by the National Police and 
verified by the UN [...]” (Reconciliation Resources, 1994: 73). During the Angolan civil war 
mercenaries from neighbouring countries such as South Africa had from time to time fought 
on both sides during the conflict. Foreign soldiers represented a security problem and in some 
cases could actually prolong the war. Annex 3 in the Lusaka Protocol aimed at the “[…] 
Repatriation of all mercenaries in Angola” (Reconciliation Resources, 1994:73). 
Messiant reports that it was obvious that none of the parties were interested in disarming; 
even the international community “understood” that UNITA kept its arsenal of weapons until 
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its political and economic position were secured. UNITA did this to achieve a better position 
to renegotiate during the peace talks.  
With this in mind the international community turned a blind eye, and accepted UNITA’s 
many false declarations that they had disarmed, even though there was evidence of the 
contrary (Messiant, 2004).  
 
The role of the UN 
In accordance with the Lusaka Protocol a joint commission was again formed, but this time 
the UN headed it. A technical working group was also established to advise on the DDR 
process. Even with the UN in a leading role as Messiant (2004) notes, the Troika was still at 
the heart of the operation. Although all the right mechanisms to assure local ownership during 
implementation and verification were established, it seemed almost for “nothing”. Savimbi 
and the UNITA had no intention of laying down their weapons. 
 
In 1995 UNAVEM II (June 1991- February 1995) became UNAVEM III (February 1995- 30 
June 1997), receiving a two-year mandate from Security Council resolution 976.  As well as 
extending its mandate the UN strengthened UNAVEM III with 7,000 peace-keeping troops in 
addition to its already 350 military observers and 260 police observers. UNAVEM III’s role 
in the DDR process was to monitor and verify the process of national reconciliation; assist in 
the quartering areas; registration and disarmament and camp coordination; assist in the 
mediation between the parties; verification of the neutrality of the Angolan National Police; to 
supervise the collection and storage of UNITA armaments; verify information received from 
the government and UNITA regarding their forces, as well as troops movement; disarming of 
civilians; coordinate, facilitate and support humanitarian activities directly linked to the peace 
process, as well as participating in mine-clearance activities; to declare formally that all 
essential requirements for the holding of the second round of presidential election had been 
fulfilled and to support , verify and monitor the electoral process. In addition, a number of 
NGOs were also assisting in the process around the assembly areas and camps (United 
Nations, UNAVEM III, 1997).  
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Porto et al. note that none of the UN missions, neither UNAVEM II nor UNAVEM III had 
any particular success. UNAVEM II had constraints because of its weak mandate and its 
shortness of resources. But according to the UN:  
“As a neutral body, UNAVEM II was an indispensable channel for communications 
and repeatedly drew the warring parties back to the negotiating process while fulfilling 
other vital functions, such as its support for humanitarian activities. To some extent, 
the Mission became important as a preventive measure to check further escalation” 
(UN /UNAVEM II, 2000). 
 
UNAVEM III was a highly costly and ineffective mission at $1 million a day, and when the 
operation did not run as smoothly as anticipated, it withdrew (Porto et al., 2007). 
UNAVEM III was planned to be phased out by February 1997 and replaced by an observer 
mission, MONUA (United Nation Obeserver Mission in Angola) (July 1996- February 1999) 
with a mandate to monitor the collection of weapons from civilians, supervise their proper 
storage or destruction and oversee security arrangements for UNITA leaders. After the 
withdrawal of the main infantry units, a reduced number of military observers would be 
retained in Angola to investigate allegations of offensive troop movements,the presence of 
any UNITA armed elements and the existence of weapons caches (United Nations, 
UNAVEM III, 1997). In late 1998 with the gradual worsening of the security situation and the 
collapsed peace process, MONUA had no other option but to continue to reduce its presence. 
As noted by the UN DPKO, upon the termination of MONUA in 1998, it was clear that the 
Angolan government did not support an extension of MONUA (UN DPKO, 2001). Even with 
a more robust force the UN could do nothing, but monitor the worsening situation that was 
gradually spiralling down. With no possibility to force the two parties to comply with the 
peace accord the UN had outplayed its role. UNAVEM III did not have the capacity to stop 
The growing cross-border arms flows is a National responsibility and the UNAVEM III did 
not have resources to support this enforcement.   
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Power-sharing 
A central element in the Lusaka Protocol was to achieve peace through power-sharing. 
Mistrust and non-compliance with the DDR process characterized the Lusaka peace process 
period. As Stedman observed, the climate was not suitable for a sustained peace. On the one 
hand, Savimbi had been forced back to the peace negotiations, but he had no wish to disarm 
or demobilize or even resume political talks with the government. The government, on the 
other side, reluctantly joined the peace talks in order to “please” the international community 
(Stedman, 1997). Even with adjustments that took into consideration the mistakes of the 
Bicesse Accords (power-sharing in a unified interim government), UNITA was still reluctant 
to cooperate. As Messiant notes, the Government of Unity and Reconciliation (GURN) 
installed, as late as in 1997, consisted of only a few of UNITA’s members and was 
exclusively led by the MPLA party. “The GURN was therefore “reconciled” and “united” 
only by name, as Messiant points out (2004).  Its democratic and transitional effort had 
existed only in the peace protocols but not in practice or in the field.  
 
 
Sub-conclusion for the Lusaka DDR process 
The Lusaka DDR process was a sad interlude that only created more harm than good. The 
planning by the UN was founded on weak assumptions using old data and poor understanding 
of the underlying causes of the conflict. UN had negotiated the peace and had aimed at 
learning from the shortcomings of the previous Bicesse Accord. This time the time frames 
were more flexible. Some has argued they were too flexible, so that the UNITA could use the 
peace to regroup and rearm. The UN wanted to avoid a fixed date for the second round of 
presidential elections and therefore the time frame was not so rigid. However, the war broke 
out and the second round was never held. The next important lesson from Bicesse was that 
“winner takes all” contests should be avoided, but it was precisely what the contestants 
wanted. Savimbi didn’t want to share a coalition with the MPLA party.  Therefore the 
government of national unity (GURN) did not have the intended trust-building effect. The 
UNAVEM III did however manage to demobilize some 50,000 ex-UNITA combatants, which 
was almost two thirds of what was planned for. Reintegration of former UNITA combatants 
into a joint army (FAA) and Police were both in the interest of reconciliation and future 
stability. However, when war resumed in late 1998 only 10,800 had reported to service (under 
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50 per cent). A regional approach to weapons control was not effective until the very end of 
the Lusaka period, when the regional and international community imposed stricter sanctions. 
With no mandate to intervene the UN could just monitor and verify that both parties 
undermined and set aside the Lusaka Protocol and kept on rearming in secret. Both the joint 
national committees and the presence of international observers had no effect on the parties’ 
willingness to disarm. Even with a reinforced UN with some 7,000 peace-keepers it could do 
little but watch the downward spiral of mistrust. Trust-building through the transitional 
government did not seem to have any stabilizing effect. In order to participate in the peace 
process and be part of the transitional government, Savimbi had been forced to unilateral 
disarmament, which was not in the interest of UNITA. Disarmament was the ticket to join the 
peace process.  But, Savimbi had a dilemma, on the one hand he was forced to disarm in order 
to participate in the process and on the other hand he felt the peace accord was in UNITA’s 
disfavour. He could therefore not demilitarize before its political status was secured. The 
Lusaka DDR process failed because of several combined factors: the timing was not right; 
both parties were able to sustain its war machinery with fresh supplies despite the fact that 
they were officially part of the DDR process; there were no real incentives for playing the 
“peace game”; a shared government of national unity did not foster any trust and even the 
Troika turned a blind eye on the many breaches and violations of the peace process. When the 
MPLA government resumed the war the UN could do nothing but withdraw its contingent.  
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 The Lusaka DDR process 1994- 1998 
Key criteria considered important for successful 
peace/DDR processes 
Result of the DDR process with analysis 
 
Realistic timeframes To loose time frames and no date for second 
round of elections. Too flexible time frames led 
to regrouping and rearming of UNITA. 
Reorganization of the armed forces/creation of a 
new unified army 
Part of the peace accord but not successful. 
Fewer than 50% of UNITA combatants reported 
for service in the new FAA.  
Regional approach to weapons control Absent. Sanctions against UNITA did not have 
effect until the very the end of the period. 
The role of the UN Not successful. The UN negotiated the peace 
protocol, UNAVEM III, was reinforced with 
7000 peace-keepers, but could not intervene in 
the breaches of the peace process because of the 
lack of cross-border weapons control 
 Power - sharing Not successful. Provisions for power-sharing in 
the form of a government of national unity 
(GURN) was part of the Lusaka Protocol, but did 
not have the political effect of trust building. 
Savimbi acted as a spoiler and refused to 
participate. 
Table 4.3 Analysis of the Lusaka DDR process 
 
4.4 The	  Luena	  Memorandum	  of	  Understanding	  -­	  “Peace	  through	  war”	  
 
Lack of trust between the government and Savimbi during the Lusaka process escalated in the 
outbreak of renewed war in 1998. A key factor ss Messiant explains both parties had prepared 
for new confrontations, because the arms race had continued unpunished. The government 
had judged its capabilities strong enough to wage a new war. The international community 
blamed UNITA for the collapse of the peace process by not disarming in the first place.  
Thereby the government also had the international community on its side, and the imposition 
of increased sanctions made UNITA weaker in many ways (Messiant, 2004). I will elaborate 
on what these sanctions were in my analysis below. Rupiya and Njeri note that the war that 
raged between 1998 and 2002 also had a strong impact on the Angolan people: from one 
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million IDPs up to this point it now increased to more than 4.5 million by 2000 (Rupiya and 
Njeri, 2004). As noted by Messiant, at the MPLA`s fourth Congress in Luanda on 5 
December 1998, President Dos Santos did the inevitable: 1) He kicked out the UN, and 2) 
launched the “peace through war” strategy to finally eliminate the UNITA (Messiant, 2004). 
The strategy of the government became a “one bullet solution”. As Meijer states: “the killing 
of UNITA `s leader Savimbi by Angolan government forces was decisive in ending Angola’s 
conflict” (Meijer, 2004).  According to Vines and Oruitemeka, the Luena Memorandum of 
Understanding (LMU) was signed in April 2002 by UNITA chief of staff General Geraldo 
Abreu Kamorteiro and the head of Angola’s armed forces, General Armando da Cruz Neto. 
The LMU was built on the preceding Lusaka Protocol from 1994 and Bicesse Accords from 
1991 (Vines and Oruitemeka, 2009). The difference this time, as Steenken and Parsons 
explains, was that the Luena Memorandum more belonged to the winning part. The LMU was 
not a negotiated settlement; the UNITA had been militarily defeated, politically isolated and 
demoralized due to the shifting of power. (Steenken, personal communication, 19 August 
2011 and Parsons, 2004). As Berdal et al. point out, the talks took place primarily between the 
two military forces. The treaty did not leave any room for constructive political talks or third 
party involvement, and it also left out civil society. This may be due to the fact that the 
political wing of UNITA was partly absent and not unified at that time (Vines and 
Oruitemeka, 2009). As a consequence, the Luena Memorandum failed to address political 
issues such as the broader democratisation process.  
 
According to Vines and Oruitemeka, UNITA abolished its armed wing in August 2002 
declaring itself disarmed and becoming a political party in October. In December 2002, the 
MPLA Political Bureau and the UNITA standing committee signed a Memorandum of 
Understanding closing the outstanding issues from the Lusaka Protocol, and on 9 December 
2002 the UN lifted its sanctions on UNITA. Shortly after observers declared that “UNITA’s 
return to war would be unlikely, if only because of its inability to wage war” (Vines and 
Oruitemeka, 2009:206). Isasìas Samakuva, as noted by Berdal et al., was elected as new 
leader at UNITA’s ninth congress in June 2003, defeating the interim leader General Gato 
who led UNITA after Savimbi’s death. UNITA was now a political party and had to 
“formulate policies that appeal to ordinary Angolans”, as Samakuva formulates the principal 
challenges facing the new UNITA (Vines and Oruitemeka, 2009:206).  
 
 
70 
In the original text of the LMU, there were seven phases, as listed below, the timeline 
described as “D–Day” explains how long the phases would last. The process was to begin on 
the day of signing of the LMU (D-Day) and be completed after 262 days (D- Day + 262).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Box 4.2: Timetable of application of the Memorandum of Understanding (Luena Memorandum of 
understanding, 2002). 
 
To oversee the Luena Memorandum two structures were created: a new Joint Military 
Commission (JMC) and a Technical Group (TG) representing the two parties involved: the 
UNITA and the government with observers from the Troika and the UN. In august 2002, the 
Security Council authorized a UN observer mission, the United Nations Mission in Angola 
(UNMA). The UNMA would “contribute to the consolidation of peace” (Vines and 
Oruitemeka, 2009:207).  
 
Vines and Oruitemeka note that the Angolan government with assistance from the World 
Bank launched a Programme for Demobilization and Reintegration (PGDR). To lead and 
oversee this programme the Institute for Socio-Professional Reintegrating of Ex-Combatants 
1) Signing of the memorandum and declaration of bilateral ceasefire (D-Day).  
2) Disengagement, quartering and conclusion of the demilitarization of the UNITA military forces        
(D- Day +2 days). 
3) Consolidation and re-establishment of the Ceasefire, including total cessation of military actions 
throughout the national territory and the non-dissemination of hostile propaganda            (D Day + 
001). 
4): Disengagement, quartering and conclusion of demilitarization of UNITA military forces 
Quartering, disarming and repatriation of foreign military forces in the areas of the national territory 
Under control of UNITA military forces (D DAY +002 to D +047). 
5) Integration of Generals and Senior Officers from the UNITA military forces into the National 
Police, in accordance with the existing structural vacancies (D Day + 048 to D+ 078). 
6) Demobilization of the excess personnel from the UNITA military forces and the extinction of the 
UNITA military forces (D- Day + 79 days to D +80 days).  
7) Vocational reintegration of demobilized personnel of the ex-UNITA military forces into national 
life (D- Day +81to D + 262 days).  
Additionally, the LMU had provisions for national reconciliation through a global amnesty for all 
crimes committed during the war. Foreign military forces were to be repatriated within D-Day + 47 
days as stated in the LMU (Reconciliation Recources, 2002). 
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(IRSEM) was re-established. The IRSEM was created in 1995 after the Lusaka Protocol but 
was not really functioning until the Luena Memorandum. Later in March 2004 the World 
Bank’s Multi-Country Demobilization and Reintegration Programme (MDRP) launched the 
Angola Demobilisation and Reintegration Programme (ADRP) jointly with IRSEM. The 
MDRP ended in 2008. Further, the DDR programme in Angola was budgeted at $ 246, 3 
million, of which $ 123,.5 million was allocated for disarmament and demobilization. 
Included in the budget were five months’ Transitiona Support Allowance (TSA), transport 
and kits for the quartered soldiers. The Angolan government had budgeted for 63 per cent of 
the overall costs of the PGDR (Vines and Oruitemeka, 2009). 
The LMU also had provisions for reconciliation and trust-building. As noted by Vines and 
Oruitemeka, UNITA would receive $13-14 million per year from the state to renovate its 
party. Additionally, President dos Santos gave posts to six ambassadors, jobs to three 
provincial governors and four deputy governors. The FAA would also accept the reintegration 
of 5,000 members of the UNITA including 18 generals and 40 to the National Police (Ibid). 
According to Vines and Oruitemeka, quartering and demobilization were to be executed 
quickly and were initially planned to take eighty days with a total of 50,000 soldiers. But as 
the programme progressed twice as many soldiers reported to the quartering areas. The 
revised plan became to demobilize 85,000 in 2002 and an additional 20,000 in 2003. Thereby 
the number of UNITA soldiers to demobilize would be 105,000 and 33,000 government 
troops (Ibid). Demobilization officially took place on 2 august 2002, as all former UNITA 
soldiers would first be integrated in to the FAA, and then demobilized (Parsons, 2004). The 
FAA was in charge of the camps, which involved identifying and registering the combatants, 
organizing transportation to areas of settlement and paying salaries. Vines and Oruitemeka 
point out that by July 2002, 85,585 former combatants and 288,756 family members were 
registered in the quartering areas. 14,854 combatants came later, possibly held back until the 
UNITA was confident with the progression of the peace process. On 23 October 2003 the UN 
Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) reported that the Gathering Areas 
had been closed and emptied (Vines and Oruitemeka, 2009). The disarmament programme 
managed to collect some 33,000 small arms and 300,000 rounds of ammunition, as noted by 
Vines and Oruitemeka, 2009 and Parsons, 2004. Circulation of small arms was high due to 
almost three decades of war, and it was estimated by Parsons that around 3-4 million small 
arms were in the hands of civilians. During the war the government had also armed the civil 
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militia (Parsons, 2004). According to Vines and Oruitemeka, (2009) between 1999 and 2007 
the Angolan Ministry of External Relations reported that about 158,000 weapons were 
retrieved from the civilian population, and prior to the 2008 elections the government 
implemented a campaign to re-launch its disarmament initiative and managed to collect 
42,000 firearms. The reintegration programme was planned in late 2002, as Parsons notes 
(2004), but did not commence until April 2004 after negotiations with the World Bank over 
funding issues. By 2005, “only 24 projects worth 94 million had reached 23,500 ex-
combatants in six provinces” (Vines and Oruitemeka, 2009:209). It was the IRSEM that was 
responsible for the implementation of integration. The IRSEM had offices in all of Angola’s 
18 provinces as a base to implement its projects. The projects were: assistance for 
development programmes; monitoring and coordinating of reintegration activities such as 
economic and social reintegration. TSA were paid for the equivalent of five months in the 
Armed Forces, between $300 and $900. The IRSEM was responsible for transportation and 
resettlement packages and issued an additional $100, and a “reintegration kit” of household 
items and such, together with ID documents (Escola de Culura de Pau, 2008). Vines and 
Oruitemeka point out furthermore that it was not just economic reasons for the delay of 
almost two years for the start up of the programme but it was also due to low institutional 
capacity (Vines and Oruitemeka, 2009). Between 2004 and 2008 many projects saw the light 
of day, and according to Berdal et al. President dos Santos realized that the programme was 
progressing too slowly and in November 2005 pledged to “speed up the reintegration”. This 
did have a positive impact in two ways: directly through further reintegration and for 
“consolidating peace” (Vines and Oruitemeka, 2009:210).   
According to the MDRP, by August 2008, 97,390 ex- combatants were demobilized, 92,297 
direct beneficiaries have completed reintegration activities (MDRP fact sheet, 2008). See 
figure 4.4 below. 
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Table 4.4: Demobilised and reintegrated ex-combatants’ receiving support from the ADRP project 
per August 2008 (source: MDRP factsheet August 2008). 
 
 
Analysis of the Luena DDR process 
 
In the following I will analyze the Luena DDR process with reference to the criteria or factors 
that are perceived as important for determining the success or failure of DDR processes. 
 
Realistic timeframes 
According to Vines and Oruitemeka, and Porto et al., the complexity of the planning and 
implementation of the Luena DDR process manifested itself in serious challenges. The 
government had planned a swift demilitarization of initially 50,000 former UNITA 
combatants in only eighty days, however the DDR process ended up with demobilizing 
105,000 UNITA combatants. 
Initially, 18 Quartering Areas, QAs (later named Gathering Areas (GA) to reflect the 
transition from soldier to civilian) were planned for, but this number had to be expanded to 35 
with extra satellite areas around 16 of the country’s provinces, as Vines and Oruitemeka note. 
The first phase (disarmament and demobilization) was prematurely declared complete after 
only four months into the process. It was not until 23 October 2003 that OCHA officially 
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reported that the GAs had been closed and emptied. The official DDR process ended up by 
demobilizing a total of 138,000 soldiers, 105,000 from the UNITA and 33,000 from the 
Angolan Armed Forces (FAA) (Vines and Oruitemeka, 2009, Porto et al., 2007).  
 
Program item Total 
Gathering Areas 35 
UNITA 105,000 
FAA soldiers 33,000 
Total demobilized 138,000 
Child soldiers on both sides 
(CAFF) 
11,000 
Tabel 4.5: Total demobilzed UNITA and FAA soldiers during the Luena              
Memorandum of Understanding per October 2003. 
 
Furthermore, according to the World Bank (2005), it also included an estimated 11,000 
children associated with fighting forces (CAFF). The reduction of the FAA by a total of 
33,000 men was the result of assistance from the Portuguese Institute of Military Studies 
(Escola de Culture de Pau, 2009). According to Vines and Oruitemeka, “Demobilisation and 
disarmament since the Luena Memorandum can be judged largely successful, but when many 
former combatants would now consider themselves demobilised, reintegration levels have 
been more disappointing” (Vines and Oruitemeka, 2009:209). However, according to 
Hitchcock, there were enormous logistical problems for which the JMC and TG and 
humanitarian partners were unprepared. In order to understand the challenge it is worth 
looking at the size of how large Angola is. Angola is at the same size as both France and 
Germany together coupled with additional weak infrastructure. Furthermore, a “lack of 
adequate planning and unrealistic timetables resulted in huge numbers of ex-combatants not 
receiving the necessary supplies of attention” (Hitchcock, 2004:39). There were also reports 
of malnutrition and other health problems in the camps (Ibid). The numbers of eligible ex-
combatants were according to Porto et al., subject to constant revision and negotiations 
between the government and the UNITA’s Management Commission. The government 
wanted a swift DDR process and it was under pressure internally and internationally to 
normalize the situation quickly. A complete DDR process would therefore be seen as 
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evidence of the success of an end to the war (Porto et al., 2007). The cost of the DDR process 
was probably also an important reason why the government initially only planned to 
demobilize 50,000 UNITA combatants. Demobilization is a benefit for the ex-combatant and 
an economic challenge for the government: the less it had to support the ex-combatants the 
better. The constant negotiations between the government and the UNITA may have been an 
economic issue as well. Hitchcock stresses that the government’s eagerness to close the GAs 
quickly even before the demobilization was complete, resulted in low morale and negative 
experiences among the ex- combatants. The problem was compounded, as many had to leave 
before they could receive demobilization cards and could not get the benefit owed to them. In 
addition, the reintegration program was not sufficiently planned and not operational when 
they left the GAs. The challenge is two-fold: on the one hand, the ex-combatants need to stay 
long enough in the camps to be properly demobilized. On the other hand, if the quartering 
becomes too long, the ex-combatants start to build their own “settlement” around the camps 
and the reintegration phase will be prolonged (Hitchcock, 2004). As Porto et al., (2009) 
comment, many camps became their own communities with schools, basic health care and 
markets. Some agencies also distributed seeds for farming but this had a twofold impact. On 
the one hand, when people started to cultivate crops, the government feared that a new 
enclave of UNITA ex-combatants would settle in the area. On the other hand, because the 
reintegration process was not begun, the ex-combatants didn’t know how long they were 
staying and needed the food they could harvest. Obviously, this slowed the return of some ex-
combatants and internally displaced people (IDP) in some areas but an enclave of UNITA ex-
soldiers did not develop (Ibid). 
 
Phase two, reintegration, went slowly, as observed by Porto et al. It was not until 2004 that 
the ARDP was fully launched and funding by the World Bank was secured. Hitchcock argues 
that from the outset there was no clear framework for reintegration, which is why it took two 
years to secure the funding. Reintegration projects were also few: only vocational training and 
economic support actually materialized, and there the government seemed to lack the will and 
means to support the programme further. Additionally, these shortcomings illustrate the 
importance of planning for all three phases prior to the commencement of the DDR process 
(Hitchcock, 2006). Porto et al. conducted a field study on the economic standing, livelihoods 
and expectations two years after the end of the war. 
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Their “…survey showed that the ex-combatants had yet to achieve a level of economic 
reintegration that would be sustainable to move him/her beyond the levels of 
vulnerability. This meant that the former combatant was greatly dependant on 
secondary assistance from humanitarian agencies. The reason was partly because of 
few jobs and lack of formal education, those harvesting land were greatly dependent 
on whether the agricultural season was bad or good…” (Porto et al., 2007:115). 
Important for all demobilized soldiers is to have demobilization documents, as these 
documents entitle the holder to receive reinsertion packages. 79 per cent of those interviewed 
in Porto et al.’s study did have the formal documents, but even then around 40 per cent were 
left without the reinsertion assistance, as Hitchcock too notes (2006). These packages often 
represent a critical transition safety net during the first few months after demobilisation to 
cover the basic needs.  
Porto et al. point out that a factor of concern was the community reception of ex-combatants. 
There was a belief that because ex-combatants belonged to a reintegration programme and 
had received reinsertion packages (benefits that other resettled did not receive), tensions could 
arise between them and other vulnerable groups that did not have individual benefits. On the 
question of how the ex-combatants were welcomed, almost 90% of the interviewed group 
stated that the community they resettled in received them very well. They were allocated land, 
housing, food, and goods. Those (10 per cent) who were not welcomed said the complaints 
were mostly verbal abuse or social discrimination (Porto et al., 2007). This was not the case in 
all provinces, as noted in a report by the Norwegian Refugee Council on the “profile of 
internal displacement in Angola”. This report stated security concerns and some cases of 
violence in a local municipality in the Moxico province. Locals were protesting against the 
return of a former UNITA general to their community. This protest prompted around 2000 
former UNITA solders to leave the municipality (Norwegian Refugee Council, 2008). DDR 
planners are familiar with this episode, as I learned at the Folke Bernadotte Academy. During 
the war the civilian population that was left behind in the villages was often under great 
pressure from the military forces and was pressed to cooperate, involuntarily recruited or in 
many cases killed (FBA, 2009). Land held by UNITA forces was inaccessible to many 
humanitarian organizations because of the war and this led to humanitarian catastrophes 
(Stedman, 1997). 
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Porto et al.’s study also dealt with the question of what made the ex-combatants feel 
reintegrated. Most of those interviewed answered that owning, borrowing or renting a house 
was the most important factor. 60 per cent of those interviewed who did not have access to a 
house did not feel integrated.  As for the future, finding a job was the most important priority. 
Having a job and access to a house helped ex-combatants feel reintegrated. Those who had a 
permanent formal job in the public sector were the ones with the highest sense of 
reintegration. Those who did not feel reintegrated did not have a house nor had too high 
expectations from the demobilization (Porto et al., 2007). The survey was carried out in the 
three provinces that received the largest caseloads of ex- UNITA combatants for return and 
reintegration.  A total of 46,000 out of 105,000 (45%) were to be integrated in to the 
provinces of Huamo, Bié, and Huila. These three provinces also saw the fiercest fighting 
(Ibid). Among the lessons learned from the field study of Porto et al. is that it is important to 
be realistic about the expectations a reintegration programme can accommodate, and it is also 
important to know the community which the ex-combatants are being reintegrated back to.  
A study performed by the MDRP by the end of its six-year programme, in 2008 disclosed the 
following as shown in table 4.5 below: 
 
4% were formally employed;  
35% were unemployed (whole nation about 25%); 
61% of ex- combatants were self-employed; 
93% considered themselves reintegrated into their communities; 
95% had access to agriculture land; 
98% had established families. 
Table 4.6: Socio-economic study performed by the MDRP program in 2008 (MDRP, 2008; 
Redvers, 2009) 
 
The survey was based on interviews with 10,500 ex- UNITA combatants. Further progress 
show that 84,409 beneficiaries have received direct or indirect reintegration support, and the 
government has decided to finance a follow up project following the closure of the MDRP 
programme to meet the target of 128,000 (MDRP, 2008).  
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Reorganization of the armed force/creation of a new unified army  
 
As stated by the LMU and the School for a Culture of Peace (2009), the reorganization plan 
of FAA was to involve the reintegration of 5,000 UNITA soldiers and later a reduction of 
30,000 men from the Angolan Armed Forces (FAA) aided by Portugal.  The number from 
each category is mentioned in annex 2 of the LMU and aimed to incorporate some 3000 
soldiers and 2000 officers and non commissioned officers, including 12 Generals and 18 
Brigadiers. Some of the remaining Generals (6) and Brigadiers (14) were to be at the hand of 
the General Staff of the FAA. Additionally, 40 Generals were integrated into the National 
Police (Reconciliation Resources, 2002). The integration was important in order to achieve a 
united national army and police.   
Integration of the agreed UNITA soldiers into the FAA began with a selection on 15 July 
2002 and the integration formally started on the 20 July 2002. According to Porto et al., the 
government prematurely announced on 2 August 2002 that the demobilization and 
demilitarisation process of the UNITA was complete and that UNITA military forces had 
ceased to exist. This shows the eagerness of the government to see the end of UNITA as a 
military capacity as the announcement was made while UNITA combatants were still arriving 
at the quartering areas. 
 
Regional approach to disarmament and weapons control 
According to Rupiya and Njeri, the pressure on UNITA grew in the years between 1998 and 
2002, following the collapse of the Lusaka process. There was much at stake and the 
government had now mortgaged the country’s oil potential for the next two decades in order 
to equip its forces to win the final war. Together with imposed travel, trade, fuel and military 
sanctions the situation grew worse for Savimbi. Furthermore, as noted by Rupiya and Njeri, a 
regional approach by the Southern African Development Community (SADC) branded 
UNITA as “a pariah organisation serving the interests of imperialists” The effect of the SADC 
position was to close off the neighbouring states for rear bases. The ability of the UNITA to 
function at a regional level, which had been so crucial for its guerrilla tactics, was now closed 
off. Rupiya and Njeri also state that the “final nail” in the coffin came when the US ceased to 
support its overt and covert operations. The US had been a long-standing ally of the UNITA, 
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but when Savimbi refused to acknowledge the elections in 1992, US support was gradually 
reduced. Another factor looked at by Rupiya and Njeri was the fact that needing Angola’s oil, 
the US was now economically driven to change “horses”, because “gambling” on the wrong 
horse would have future economic consequences (Rupiya and Njeri, 2004). Savimbi was 
condemned by the international community as a rebel, and the US could no longer support his 
actions. In practical terms the FAA had closed the borders to Namibia and thereby prevented 
UNITA from mounting operations inside Namibia.  In addition, as Rupiya and Njeri state, the 
Namibian forces were securing the borders while the FAA was deploying its forces into 
UNITA’s backyard (Ibid).  
 
UNITA became weaker militarily for several reasons: the sealing of the borders by the 
Namibian defence forces, together with international sanctions, a government that freely 
could purchase arms because it was a legal act to defend itself against a rebel force, and the 
FAA were conducting operations that reduced UNITA’s manoeuvres and playground. A 
combination of the mentioned factors may all have had a significant effect on UNITA’s 
military power.   
 
The sanctions against UNITA were still effective during the peace talks and thereby UNITA 
was deprived of its possibilities to rearm and regroup. Furthermore, according to the LMU, 
foreign military forces within areas under UNITA control were to be quartered, disarmed and 
repatriated within 47 days (Reconciliation Resources, 2002). The foreign fighters were mainly 
from the DRC and Rwanda of Hutu and Tutsi origin. The UN with assistance from the 
UNHCR would repatriate them to their countries of origin (Ibid).  
 
Disarming UNITA resulted in the disappointing collection of only 33,000 light weapons and 
300,000 rounds of ammunition, according to Vines and Oruitemeka (2009). The relatively 
small amounts can be viewed in various ways. On the one hand, UNITA’s munitions stocks 
were actually depleted during the last phases of the war and they did not have any more 
weapons to surrender. On the other hand, UNITA did hide weapons for later use in case the 
peace process did not evolve as anticipated. The weapons-to-man ratio was only 3 to 1, which 
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is very low. According to the estimations of Vines and Oruitemeka, probably 90 percent of 
the hand weapons were actually collected and about 10 per cent remained with the civilian 
population (Ibid). 
 
Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) programme was not part of the LMU as a special 
item as was the case under the Lusaka protocol. According to Vines and Oruitemeka (2009), 
during the peace talks, UNITA repeatedly reported unease about the large number of weapons 
in the hands of the civilian population. This unease is understandable because the ex- UNITA 
soldiers knew the power a weapon could have: UNITA disarmed while the FAA and the 
civilians had guns. As Vines and Oruitemeka describe, the challenge in the years to come 
would be to register and collect those arms. Angola with its over three decades of war 
probably had 2- 2.5 million weapons unaccounted for. The government did however try to 
combat the proliferation of arms and through the years from 1999 to 2007 the government had 
collected about 158,000 weapons of various calibres from the civilian population. Berdal et al. 
also note that prior to the 2008 election the government re-launched its disarmament 
campaign to hand in illegal weapons and collected some 42,000 firearms. Data from a small 
arms survey show that in three provinces, Huambo, Biè and Huila, over 70 per cent had 
weapons in their household and almost 50 per cent said they were easily available. Most of 
the people interviewed had weapons for security reasons (Berdal et al., 2009). Crime and 
banditry have increased in the big cities over  recent years but none of these crimes can be 
particularly traced back to ex-UNITA soldiers (Vines and Oruitemeka, 2009).  
 
The role of the UN 
Paulo, Manuel J, (2004) has looked at the role of the UN in Angola and observed that the 
United Nations Mission in Angola (UNMA) was mandated to chair the JMC, and monitor the 
quartering areas with thirty observers as guarantor of the agreement. Paulo points out that the 
UN’s failure in the past undermined its ability to play a major role in the LMU. The 
government’s notion was that the UN was on UNITA’s side during the Bicesse and the 
Lusaka processes (Paulo, 2004). The government wanted a quick DDR process and wanted to 
do it in its own way, since the influence of the international community did not succeed in the 
former two processes. However, the UN was mandated through OCHA to coordinate 
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humanitarian relief with all other UN agencies (Ibid). According to the LMU, the UN and the 
Troika were only observers during the signing of the peace treaty, a treaty that was negotiated 
solely between the UNITA and the government. Furthermore, the Troika and the UN were 
also permanent observers of the JMC and members of the TG. The TG would consist of ten 
military experts from the UN and ten from the Troika and 20 from the FAA and the UNITA. 
(Reconciliation Resources, 2002). As mentioned by Vines and Oruitemeka (2009), the 
UNMA should “contribute to the consolidation of peace”. The UN was sidelined and the then 
UN special representative Ibrahim Gambari protested against an amnesty for all war crimes 
committed during the war. But the amnesty law was passed unanimously by the Angolan 
Parliament in spite of UN resistance (Berdal et al., 2009: 205). The reason for the protest was 
that the “the UN does not recognize any amnesty as applicable to genocide, crimes against 
humanity and war crimes” (Paulo, 2004).  
 
The Join Military Commission (JMC) was a forum where the UNITA could raise important 
questions concerning outstanding issues. To the dismay of UNITA, the JMC was dissolved on 
21 November 2002, almost a year before the completion of the DDR process. Berdal et al. 
note that UNITA was now afraid that dissolving the JMC would lead to difficulties in 
sustaining the dialogue with the government (Vines and Oruitemeka, 2009). It appeared that 
UNITA needed a neutral partner to voice their concerns related to its future. The government, 
on the other hand, wanted no foreign involvement because they were in a new position of 
power and military strength. 
 
Power-sharing 
A power-sharing government between the UNITA and the MPLA was formally established 
during the Lusaka peace process as a trust-building measure. The international community 
promoted the idea because it thought that the UNITA and the MPLA could govern Angola 
together.  But the government of national unity (GURN) was never wanted by UNITA nor the 
MPLA, as stated by Messiant (2004). The MPLA government’s military victory over UNITA 
rendered power-sharing irrelevant in the LMU. Hence, there were no immediate plans for 
elections in the LMU (legislative elections were scheduled for 2006, but postponed and not 
held until 2008) or a transitional government (Reconciliation Resources, 2002). This fact is an 
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important observation because elections and transitional governments are often the first 
choice of democracy assistance by the international community. Both the international 
community and power-sharing measures were absent in the LMU peace process. This 
observation is developed from notion that the earlier interference of the Troika and the 
international community probably did more harm than good to the peace process. According 
to Rupiya and Njeri, the government of Angola defined the LMU as follows: integration of 
former UNITA combatants into the new unified national army, invitation of UNITA to the 
negotiating table (even though UNITA was defeated); political recognition of UNITA; 
acknowledging possible spoilers; respect ethnic and regional diversions between north and 
south; focusing on national reconciliation and social reintegration (Rupiya and Njeri, 2004). 
Generals and high-ranking officers may have the potential of being spoilers of the DDR 
process and thereby they were given posts in the new army and police. According to Rupiya 
and Njeri, eighteen Generals were at a later stage publicly retired and provided with pensions 
and benefits for the rest of their lives (Rupiya and Njeri, 2004). This is an example that 
underscores the importance of taking care of potential spoilers of the DDR process. The FAA 
wanted to focus on UNITA’s political transformation and probably foremost to emasculate 
UNITA of its military capacity. Especially for the UNITA, as Rupiya and Njeri argues, it was 
important for their self-image to have a share in the national unified army, as opposed to total 
emasculation (Ibid). The government could achieve this by integrating 5,000 former UNITA 
combatants into the FAA. However, as Porto et al., and Vines and Oruitemeka note, the 
government did little to improve political consolidation during the peace negotiations. UNITA 
was divided politically in the aftermath of the war and the negotiations were primarily done 
through the FAA and the UNITA militaries (Vines and Oruitemeka, 2009; Porto et al., 2007). 
Between May and November 2002 the government lifted sanctions on travel for UNITA 
officials. This permitted UNITA to re-open offices, move around and try to revive itself as a 
political party. However, as Rupiya and Njeri (2004) have noted, they were met with 
challenges to reconciliation by the communities that suffered during the war. The government 
recognized that UNITA had a considerable army and it was important for the government to 
keep the UNITA army intact until the quartering and disarmament phase was completed. The 
risk was an UNITA army in total collapse and a drawn-out guerrilla war (Ibid).  
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Vines and Oruitemeka note that the success of the disarmament and demobilization came 
from the fact that the UNITA ex-combatants were in an acute state of combat fatigue.Poverty 
led to a daily struggle for survival and most UNITA ex-combatants had no choice but to 
integrate. 
 
In the aftermath of the peace process a sour taste has emerged as the lessons learned from the 
Luena peace process become clearer. As Meijer has noted, most Angolans welcomed the 
peace that put an end to nearly four decades of war through the government’s “peace through 
war strategy”. Meijer argues on the one hand that a negative peace is better than no peace at 
all. But on the other hand, as she points out, peace without a real negotiated settlement, as was 
the case during the Luena peace process, may backfire. Furthermore, Angola’s long history of 
rivalry and mutual exclusion, one-party rule and authoritarianism were not dealt with 
correctly during the peace negotiations and the price of how this was resolved may be high 
indeed. Lastly, the lessons from this experience will probably unfold over time and 
unfortunately when the many hopes and expectations from the peace process are not met 
(Meijer, 2004). Meeting expectations is crucial, as the Stockholm Initiative on DDR has 
identified. A key element is to manage expectations from the outset, to identify incentives and 
disincentives at an early stage and to use these to influence the choices of individuals and 
military groups (SIDDR, 2006; Colletta et al., 1996).  
Vines and Oruitemeka were not so pessimistic and have stated:  
“The DDR process, in Angola (ed.), can nonetheless be judged as largely successful 
because returning to war is no longer an option for UNITA, which has after its defeat 
made a successful transition from armed guerrilla movement to opposition party”. 
(Vines and Oruitemeka, 2009: 217). 
However, as bright as the future may be, the political transformation of UNITA has not 
brought any political change in Angola. The MPLA is still the biggest party; in the September 
2008 legislative elections the MPLA won a landslide victory and is now occupying 191 of 
220 seats in parliament. This election also marked the end of the Lusaka peace process.  
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Sub-conclusion for the Luena process 
As mentioned above, the Luena DDR process can largely be viewed as successful. However 
as mentioned it was a vicors peace, the peace came at the right time and place. The victor took 
advantage of all military, political, social and even economic circumstances to force its peace. 
The overall DDR process managed to demobilize 93 per cent of its targeted ex- combatants. 
During the MDRP’s six-year programme it aided the government in the reintegration process 
and support was given to 66 per cent of ex-UNITA combatants. Reorganization of the FAA 
was completed with assistance from Portugal and the integration of former UNITA 
combatants, high-ranking officers and Generals can also be viewed as successful. The 
regional approach together with the increased sanctions were effective during the last stages 
of the war and it closed the net in on UNITA’s arms supply and manoeuvrability. SALW 
programmes should have been more effective considering the large amount of weapons 
circulating among the civilian population. It is important to recognize that planning and 
implementation of the DDR process could have benefited from assistance from the UN, 
especially in running the quartering areas. But the international community and the UN in 
particular had outplayed its role during the first two peace processes and thereby were left 
with only a minor role. For the benefit of reconciliation, the MPLA government chose not to 
treat UNITA as a defeated army, instead offering recognition of the UNITA as a political 
entity. Power-sharing, which was advocated during both the Bicesse and the Lusaka peace 
processes, was discarded and not an option during the Luena negotiations. UNITA was 
practically defeated and the government had the upper hand and determined the rules of the 
game. The positive outcome of the Luena DDR process was due to the following combination 
of factors: Savimbi, the biggest spoiler of peace was no longer part of the equation, and 
through a regional approach to weapons control the MPLA government was able to reduce the 
manoeuvrability of the UNITA in its own backyard (in the neighbouring countries), cutting 
off its weapons supply and cross border rest bases. Consequently, UNITA’s stocks of 
armaments became depleted and its troops fatigued so that its remnant chose to negotiate on 
the terms offered by the militarily superior MPLA government.  
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The Luena DDR process 2002-2008 
Key criteria considered important for successful 
peace/DDR processes 
Result of the DDR process with analysis 
 
Realistic timeframes Partly successful. The numbers of UNITA 
soldiers became twice as many as anticipated. 
Government tried to close the quartering areas 
when soldiers were  still arriving. The DD 
phase lasted 1 ½ year longer than planned.  
Reorganization of the armed forces/creation of a 
new unified army  
Successful. The integration of ex -UNITA 
combatants was completed along with the 
demobilization of 30,000 FAA soldiers. 
However, the focus on SSR and weapons 
reduction was not complete. 
Regional approach to weapons control  Successful. The sanctions, the regional 
approach did minimize the UNITA`s ability to 
manoeuvre its forces and to purchase new 
weapons. The net that was closing in around 
UNITA was highly effective. 
The role of the UN Irrelevant. No provisions for UN or third party 
involvement in the negotiations of the peace 
agreement. 
 Power- sharing Irrelevant. No provisions for power-sharing. 
Trust building was achieved through other 
means. UNITA was again recognized as a 
political entity and sanctions were lifted. 
UNITA could reintegrate some 5000 ex-
combatants into the FAA. The biggest spoiler 
of the previous peace process was eliminated. 
The UNITA was depleted and forced to abide 
by the rules set by the government. 
Table 4.7: Key criteria for the Luena DDR process  
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4.5 Comparative	  analysis	  of	  the	  three	  Angolan	  DDR	  processes	  
 
In this part I will present a comparative analysis of the Bicesse, the Lusaka and the Luena 
DDR processes. Additionally, I will elaborate on the changes in the political situation that 
made the Luena DDR process successful. The data for the comparative analysis are based on 
the findings from the previous sections 4.2, 4.3, and 4.4. 
 
The background of the conflict in Angola has roots back to the early years after the country’s 
independence from Portugal in 1975. The Bicesse Accord from 1991 - 1992, and the Lusaka 
Protocol from 1994-1998 both failed to stop the downward spiral of war, whereas the last 
peace process in 2002, the Luena Memorandum of Understanding, managed to create a 
lasting peace. A key question is thus why the war flared up again in 1992 and 1998, and what 
had changed during the years up to the signing of the LMU in 2002. 
 
The Bicesse peace process in 1991 aimed at creating “Peace Through Elections”; but the 
underlying challenge was that both the MPLA and UNITA had so much faith in winning the 
election that the second option - losing was excluded. The power play was a significant factor; 
with power came the ability to control Angola's rich natural resources such as oil and 
diamonds. The situation between the parties before the election was that the MPLA had ruled 
the country corruptly with a heavy hand and all power was centralized in a one-party regime. 
UNITA, on the other hand, had up until the 1992 election gained legitimacy locally and 
internationally and had great confidence in winning the election. At the time UNITA was 
militarily equal with the MPLA, and had control over large areas of land, the central 
highlands. UNITA’s tactic was to focus on the corruption of the MPLA regime and the need 
for multiparty elections and new democratic institutions. When UNITA lost the elections, it 
accused the MPLA of fraud. The international election observers, on the other hand, labelled 
the elections “free and fair”. As a reaction, UNITA now set aside the principles of democracy 
by not approving the legitimate winner. They went back to playing the game they best knew - 
the old war game - to beat their rival through a military victory. At that time UNITA probably 
had a military force large and strong enough to be a serious threat to the MPLA. This is 
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illustrated in the peace accords: the troops to be included in the new army were to be shared 
equally as well as disarmament and demobilization of surplus combatants. The UN presence 
during the Bicesse Accords was only as an observer, but in the subsequent DDR process, the 
UN became responsible for its implementation and execution. With its limited resources (350 
military observers) the UN was thus doomed to fail. One question is whether there could have 
been peace through the Bicesse Accords if the UN had succeeded in implementing the DDR 
process. It is impossible to say because this option never got a chance to be tested. But on the 
basis of both parties' quest for hegemony, it is difficult to imagine that it would have made 
any difference. At this time both sides were playing the “winner takes all” solution and losing 
was not an option. It was therefore only the victorious party that had something to gain by 
maintaining the peace. On the other hand, if both parties had agreed to demilitarize prior to 
the election, none of the parties would have had the strength to be a threat to the other. In a 
nutshell, this is the concept of DDR: demilitarize so that the parties do not have the means to 
be a security threat anymore. 
 
In 1994, under the Lusaka Protocol, the UN had been leading the negotiations. A second 
round in the presidential election was scheduled and a transitional government (power-
sharing) would provide increased stability, trust and reconciliation. The situation had changed 
since 1992; through its internationally approved election the MPLA had been recognized as 
the winner and had formed a legitimate government. UNITA now saw a shift in its support 
from the US and the international community: UNITA had lost its main contributor and its 
legitimacy. Being pressured from all sides to return to the negotiating table UNITA 
reluctantly resumed peace talks. The 1993 UN sanctions against UNITA that resulted in an 
arms embargo were ineffective because UNITA still managed to gain access to weapons 
through illegal channels via the sale of diamonds. When the signing of the peace agreement 
took place, Savimbi refused to attend, but instead sent the General Secretary of UNITA, 
General E.N. Manuvakola. It was obvious that the power balance had changed, UNITA was 
the only party to be disarmed and demobilized. Reintegration into the armed forces was to be 
negotiated at a later date. This may be an indication that UNITA had lost the upper hand. The 
UN (UNAVEM III) was now supplied with some 7000 new peacekeeping troops and 350 
military observers who would monitor and ensure a well planned and executed DDR process. 
But the peace process and the DDR process did not work out as planned. While the UN on the 
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one hand was busy collecting weapons and demobilizing, both the government (MPLA) and 
the UNITA rearmed and mobilized their forces in secret.  Weapons that were supplied 
constituted a constant breach of the peace agreement. The relationship between the 
Government and UNITA was deteriorating through lack of trust. The Lusaka process had 
attempted to remedy the experiences of the Bicesse process, but even with more flexible time 
frames, and a coalition government of national unity (GURN) it was not sufficient. In 
retrospect, the Lusaka Protocol had theoretically better chances of success (in terms of our 
five criteria) but in practice this time there was also only one solution for the UNITA leader 
Jonas Savimbi. Due to outside factors the DDR process under both the Bicesse Accords and 
Lusaka Protocol was unsuccessful, and as a consequence the peace processes also failed. The 
UN had not managed through the DDR process to collect enough weapons nor had it 
demilitarized the agreed number of troops so that the parties would not be a threat to the 
peace anymore. The regional approach to weapons control did not become effective until after 
the war broke out again.  
 
When the war broke out again in late 1998 the Government changed its tactics: it threw out 
the UN and announced a new strategy "Peace Through War", which was a "one bullet 
solution". The government knew that it was stronger now than the UNITA and the only option 
now was to crush UNITA and gain military victory. The government even tried to have 
Savimbi internationally criminalized. Another motivating factor in the governmental change 
of tactic was the opportunity finally once and for all to end the era of conflict and instability. 
The Government that now consisted mostly of members of the MPLA party had access to 
power and resources and wanted to grow stronger. With a more stable Angola they could use 
its power to develop cooperation with international contractors for the recovery of the 
country's natural resources. The recovery would in turn provide more money and more power 
to the MPLA party. Both sides had too much to win. Therefore there could just be one winner 
of this conflict. Dos Santos became the last man standing when Savimbi was killed in battle. 
After Savimbi was killed in April 2002, and the subsequent loss of UNITA’s vice president, 
UNITA lost its senior management. This was one of the crucial factors that enabled the third 
peace process possible to initiate. The leaderless UNITA at this time got an “offer it could not 
refuse"- the Luena Memorandum of Understanding. There were several coinciding reasons for 
the fall of UNITA: UNITA had at this time lost its senior management, their combatants were 
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fatigued through many years of war, they were split politically between a local wing and an 
exile wing and they probably had no other choice but to sign a peace treaty with the 
government. The time was practically right for letting peace have a chance. The remnants of 
UNITA quickly realized that if they were to gain anything at all from this situation, it would 
be by making peace and becoming integrated into the new army. Joining the FAA was 
probably the most reasonable option they could hope for at this time. The other option was to 
continue the war with the risk of being totally eliminated. The LMU had opened up for a total 
of five thousand UNITA ex-combatants to be included in the new army and police forces. 
The government of Angola almost single-handedly took charge of the peace process and it 
budgeted for 63 per cent of overall costs and it left out the UN and the Troika to only remain 
as observers. The FAA was technically responsible for the DDR process. Even with major 
logistical problems, poor conditions in demobilization camps and the reintegration process 
that did not start until two years after the peace agreement, the DDR process is considered 
successful: A total of 30,000 weapons were collected, 105,000 UNITA soldiers were 
demobilized and over 90,000 had received reintegration assistance as of 2008. In the end the 
“peace through war” tactic became successful because the MPLA government finally 
achieved a solution to the previous lack of regional weapons control by stopping the cross-
border flow of arms to UNITA.   
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Comparative analysis of the three Angolan DDR processes 
Key criteria considered 
important for successful 
peace/DDR processes. 
Bicesse: 1991-1992 
 
Lusaka: 1994-1998 Luena: 2002-2008 
Realistic timeframes. Too rigid, not flexible and 
unrealistic to meet deadline for 
the election. 
Too loose time frames and no 
date for second round of 
elections. Too flexible time 
frames led to UNITA 
regrouping 
The numbers of UNITA 
soldiers became twice as many 
as anticipated. Government 
tried to close the quartering 
areas still when soldiers were 
arriving. DD phase lasted 1 ½ 
year longer than planned.  
Reorganization of the armed 
forces/creation of a new 
unified army. 
Not successful. UNITA only 
reintegrated 50% of its 
combatants in the new FAA. 
FAA was only nominally 
created a day ahead the 
elections. 
Not successful. Fewer than 
50% of UNITA combatants 
reported for service in the new 
FAA.  
Successful. The integration of 
ex - UNITA combatants was 
completed along with the 
demobilization of 30,000 FAA 
soldiers. However, the focus 
on SSR and weapons reduction 
was not complete. 
Regional approach to weapons 
control. 
No regional approach, “Triple 
zero” clause not effective, 
Proliferation of arms. 
Sanctions against UNITA did 
not have effect until the end of 
the period. 
Successful. The sanctions, the 
regional approach did 
minimize the UNITA`s ability 
to manoeuvre its forces and to 
purchase new weapons.. The 
biggest ally the US ceased to 
supply the UNITA with arms. 
The role of the UN. Not successful. The UN was 
not part of the negotiations and 
only invited to monitor but 
UNAVEM II was too 
understaffed to be influential. 
The UN could do nothing but 
acknowledge that the peace 
process collapsed. 
Partly successful. The UN 
negotiated the peace protocol, 
UNAVEM III was reinforced 
with 7000 peace-keepers, 
could not intervene in the 
breaches of the peace process 
because of the lack of cross-
border weapons control. 
Irrelevant. No provisions for 
third party or UN involvement 
in the negotiation of the peace 
agreement. 
 Power-sharing. Absent. No provision for trust-
building power-sharing 
through a government of 
national unity. 
Present. Provisions for a 
transitional government 
(GURN) in place, but did not 
have the political effect of trust 
building. Savimbi acted as a 
spoiler and refused to 
participate.  
Absent, No provisions for 
power - sharing. Trust-building 
was achieved through other 
means. UNITA was again 
recognized as a political entity 
and sanctions were lifted. 
UNITA could reintegrate some 
5000 ex-combatants into the 
FAA. The biggest spoiler to 
the previous peace process was 
eliminated. UNITA was 
reduced and forced to abide by 
the rules set by the 
government. 
Table 4.8: Comparative analysis of the three Angolan DDR processes 
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5 Conclusion	  
 
DDR plays a role in the transition from war to peace by preventing renewed war in fragile 
post-conflict situations. The comparative approach and analysis of my thesis may contribute 
to enhance knowledge of the interplay of the factors that were considered to be important for 
bringing an end to the war in Angola. The framework designed for my analysis may also 
prove useful for evaluating similar cases. The purpose of the thesis has been to discuss the 
following question: Why did DDR only succeed in the third and last of the three peace 
processes? 
 
In this chapter I will focus on the findings of my analysis and elaborate on some implications 
related to the theoretical framework I have used. First, I will briefly revisit each chapter and 
discuss the contents of my thesis. In Chapter two, I described the case study method and the 
use of the Most Similar System Design, and concluded with a presentation of important DDR 
literature. Chapter three was devoted to the presentation of relevant theory in order to place 
DDR processes in a peace-building context and elaborate on crosscutting issues such as: 
Security Sector Reform, and transitional justice. Lastly, the chapter elaborated on the five 
criteria believed to be important for the success or failure of DDR processes. Let me briefly 
repeat the five criteria: criterion 1. Realistic time frames: to secure successful implementation, 
peace agreements should allow for sufficient time for proper planning and realistic and 
flexible timeframes; criterion 2. Reorganization of the armed forces into a new unified army: 
to be successful peace agreements should be linked to broader security issues, such as the 
reorganization of the armed forces and other security sector reform (SSR) issues; criterion 3. 
Regional approach to weapons control: to be successful peace agreements should take a 
comprehensive approach towards disarmament and weapons control, and include a regional 
approach to weapons control in order to stop cross-border arms flows; criterion 4. The role of 
the UN: to secure successful implementation of peace agreements, the UN should participate 
in the negotiations of peace agreements it is later asked to help implement, and be granted 
sufficient resources to carry out its mandate; criterion 5. Power-sharing: to be successful 
peace agreements should contain provisions for power-sharing mechanisms to create 
confidence on the part of leaders on both sides. Power-sharing enables the parities to start 
political negotiations in a coalition government for the benefit of reconciliation and trust- 
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building that may pave the way for future elections and a democratic process.  In Chapter 
four, after a short introduction to the background and root causes of the Angolan conflict I 
turned to the analyses of each peace process based on the empirical literature. I analyzed each 
of the three DDR processes in the light of the five criteria. The chapter concluded with a 
systematic comparative analysis of all three DDR processes. 
 
After having briefly summarized the contents of the thesis I now turn to the findings in the 
analysis.  
 
In the case of Angola the two most powerful rivals’ search for hegemony during the last three 
decades left an estimated population of one million dead, over four million displaced and a 
country in ruins. The interlude between the two failed peace attempts brought even more 
killings and devastation to the country. The DDR process that should have prevented the 
armies from being able to wage war on each other did not succeed in the first two attempts. 
The findings from the Bicesse Accord showed that the reorganization of the armed forces 
(criterion 2), which had the potential of promoting peace through reconciliation, fell short and 
was not completed because the time frame (criterion 1) was too rigid and unrealistic. When 
the Bicesse Accords was negotiated the UN did not take part during the talks but was later 
given a considerably important role to monitor and verify the implementation of the peace 
agreement with resources that absurdly underestimated the enormity and complexity of the 
tasks. The UNIVEM II was understaffed and did not have the resources to fulfil its mandate 
(criterion 4). Since the Bicesse Accord was a “Peace through Election” –  an accord implying 
a “winner takes all”- election, the peace agreement did not contain any measures of power-
sharing (criterion 5). Neither the MPLA nor the UNITA wanted power-sharing arrangements. 
In the light of the outcome, power-sharing might have prevented the resumption of war. When 
the defeated party, the UNITA, refused to accept the election results it was now able to go 
back to war, because the DDR process and the reorganization of the armed forces (criterion 2) 
had not been completed because of the unrealistically short time frame (criterion 1) and 
UNITA was able to wage war due to a failed regional approach to weapons control (criterion 
3). 
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The Lusaka Protocol with its “Peace through power-sharing” agreement reflected the lessons 
learned from the Bicesse Accord. With regard to the time frames (criterion 1), the rigid and 
unrealistically short time frames in the Bicesse Accord led to the obvious failure of the 
implementation of the DDR process. The Lusaka Protocol therefore tried to accommodate the 
previous shortcomings and provided for more flexibility in the time frames. On the other 
hand, the experience from the Lusaka process showed that the time frames should not be “too 
loose or too flexible”. The spoiler, UNITA, took advantage of the flexibility and sabotaged 
the DDR process by procrastination. While power-sharing (criterion 5) was absent in the 
Bicesse Accord, power-sharing became a central element of the Lusaka Protocol, but the 
spoiler Savimbi refused to take part in the Government of Unity and National Reconciliation 
(GURN). With regard to criterion 4, the UN did now play a leading role during the 
negotiations leading up to the Lusaka Protocol and was also given more resources to oversee 
and implement the agreement. UNAVEM III was given over 7000 peace-keeping troops. 
However, the positive effect of meeting criterion 4 in the Lusaka Protocol was counteracted 
by the negative effect of the absence of a regional approach to weapons control (criterion 3). 
Despite the UN imposed sanctions on UNITA, the UN was still unable to prevent UNITA 
from continuing to purchase weapons (through its control of diamond resources), and thus act 
as a spoiler. Hence, the negative effect of criterion 3 neutralized and revoked the positive 
effect of a stronger mandate and more resources to the UN (criterion 4). Hence, the UN did 
not accomplish its mandate and the mission it was set to do during the Lusaka process. The 
MPLA government concluded that the Lusaka process had failed, and that the only option left 
was “Peace through War”.  
During the final war (1998-2002), the MPLA government managed to achieve regional 
control of the supply of weapons to UNITA (criterion 3). Through agreements with its 
neighbouring countries and increased UN sanctions, the MPLA managed to “seal off” and 
take control of its borders, and thereby stop weapons delivery to UNITA. With the subsequent 
killing of Savimbi, the biggest spoiler was physically eliminated. Therefore, in the Luena 
process, the MPLA government was in a position to decide the peace conditions offered to the 
politically divided and militarily weakened UNITA. Power-sharing (criterion 5) was now out 
of the question and irrelevant. UNITA had much to lose if it continued to fight, but had 
“something” to gain by accepting the MPLA`s offer: reintegration into the FAA (fulfilment of 
criterion 2) and the acceptance of UNITA as a political party. Since the Luena process is an 
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internal government affair, UN participation (criterion 4) was irrelevant and without any 
consequence for the Luena process. 
 
Based on the results of my findings I will argue that peace was achieved when the MPLA 
government won a military victory on the battlefield through its “peace through war” strategy. 
A strategy that had been tried over many years of civil war, finally the government built 
capacity and outmanouvred UNITA- the time was right – the opportunity was there. The 
concomitant death of the UNITA leader, Jonas Savimbi who was thought of as the greatest 
spoiler of the DDR process, may therefore have eased the post-conflict transitions phase and 
the immediate reconciliation. UNITA was militarily defeated, it was politically divided and 
the only option to being totally eliminated was to demilitarize and continue its search for 
power through political means. Hence, sustained peace became possible when UNITA and 
Savimbi were no longer able to spoil the peace process. The most important factor that 
created this atmosphere was the prior regional approach to weapons control that reduced 
UNITA’s military manoeuvrability and its ability to purchase weapons (criterion 3).  UNITA 
ex-combatants could now finally be reintegrated of into the unified army (criterion 2).  
 
Theoretical implications 
I would like to reflect on some theoretical implications from the conclusions of my thesis. The 
theoretical framework developed for the purpose of analyzes of the three DDR processes has 
come about from relevant theory by renowned scholars and practitioners. DDR processes do 
not evolve in a “vacuum” and parallel processes concerning the peace process will therefore 
have positive or negative effect on the outcome and it is difficult to attribute the success to 
DDR alone. The five criteria developed for this thesis are in a way interlinked and depend on 
the parties’ compliance with the DDR process. This thesis has analyzed three Angola DDR 
processes with the aim of ascertaining the factors that determine their successes and failures. 
The theoretical framework of the thesis does, however, allow us to discuss some theoretical 
implications with regards to my conclusion. 
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I would like to start with the Lusaka peace process, which in many ways was a product and a 
refinement of the previous Bicesse process. The UN was not involved during the Bicesse 
process and the international community later thought that a stronger and more involved UN 
could guarantee and safeguard the Lusaka peace process. The UN had learned from its 
previous experience, went forward, facilitated and took a leading role during the Lusaka 
agreement. Theoretically the Lusaka agreement did have what the Bicesse agreement did not 
have; a peace agreement negotiated by the UN; a strong and well-equipped UN peace-keeping 
force mandated to verify and monitor the peace agreement; provisions for a transitional 
power-sharing government (GURN); and lastly, disarmament should be concluded before 
entering the GURN. But, sadly there were no political will from the parties in the conflict to 
act on it. These were among the lessons from the Bicesse peace process that were 
implemented during the Lusaka agreement. The only factor that the UN and the international 
community not could control was UNITA; once again UNITA spoiled the peace process. 
Theoretically, the Lusaka peace process should have had all chances of succeeding but the 
spoiling activity of the UNITA could not be controlled. UNITA could do this because it had 
the means and the opportunity – through its resources in the diamond trade and with the 
cooperation of “good friends” that provided arms through Angola’s “porous” borders.  
Power-sharing (criterion 5) was at this time probably seen as one of the biggest shortcomings 
of the Bicesse agreement. According to Stedman (1997), power-sharing was also proposed 
during the Bicesse Accord in its early phases, but rejected by the parties due to the absence of 
political will. Later during the Lusaka Protocol when the UN was in the lead, it was employed 
as a consequence of the lessons learned from the Bicesse process. In the aftermath of the 
Bicesse peace process Margaret Anstee (at the time UN’s Special Representative to Angola) 
argued; “[…] power-sharing might have helped bring an end to Angola’s ongoing violence” 
(Noel et al., 2005:187). Anstee’s argument is also backed by later studies, by scholars like 
Binningsbø, who in her preliminary findings has identified that; “[…] power-sharing 
democracy is the best approach to achieve sustainable peace in all post-conflict societies, 
regardless of how the conflicts end” (Binningsbø, 2006:19). On the contrary, the use of 
power-sharing as a means of trust-building is however contested, as I have discussed in 
chapter three. The reply to Anstee’s suggestions about a power-sharing government was 
heavily contested by the then Namibian prime minister: “Then you want second-class 
democracy for Africa! In the UK one party wins and governs, the others lose and don’t and 
that is the way it should be. That is the way here” (Noel et al., 2005:187). On both occasions 
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it was an internationally believed idea that power-sharing would create trust and 
reconciliation. A question is what did the UN understand about the personal agendas of the 
two party leaders? As mentioned by Steenken members of the international community had to 
be avare of elements of the parties hidden agendas but wre blinded by the then “cold war” 
idealogies and politics (Steenken, personal communication 19 august 2011). Beforehand 
Savimbi was even reluctant to take part in the government of unity- and showed this by not 
personally showing up to sign the agreement; later he also withdrew his officials from the 
government in protest at the unilateral disarmament of the peace agreement. The UN, the 
international community and the Troika in particular later admitted that they did not fully 
calculate the internal agendas of the parties (Messiant 2004). With reference to an earlier 
statement by Stedman in chapter three: “[…] the most perfectly crafted power-sharing 
institutions in the world are useless if one of the parties does not want to share power” 
(Stedman, 1997:8). The Lusaka agreement reveals the limitations of what the UN or the 
international community can achieve if the parties, or one of the parties, in this case UNITA, 
do not want to abide by the rules. So although lessons were learned from the failure of the 
previous process by installing the UN in the lead, this had minimal effect. This particular 
example shows the need for a strong mandated UN peace-keeping force (criterion 4) in 
parallel with a regional approach to weapons control (criterion 3) sanctioned by the 
international community. 
 
Lastly, during the final war the MPLA government managed to secure the borders and limit 
the UNITA’s possibility to rearm and regroup in the neighbouring countries. This 
achievement was probably, apart from the elimination of Savimbi, the single most important 
factor in facilitating peace (criterion 3). During the Luena peace process UNITA was, cut off 
from its weapons’ supply and diamond trade and therefore did not have the means or the 
opportunity to spoil the peace process. The Angolan government was single-handedly in 
charge of the peace process (a nationally owned process); power -sharing was now irrelevant 
and had no practical implication; the UN was discredited and had no role in the peace-
building process. However, in the aftermath of the peace process the political climate in 
Angola would probably have benefited from a power-sharing government, which could have 
assisted UNITA in its transformation into a political party.  
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The Angola case shows that even under the best circumstances a positive outcome from 
(criterion 1, 2 and 3;the Lusaka process) an internationally negotiated peace agreement will 
have great limitations on what it can achieve if the parties are reluctant to comply and they are 
still in position of the means and opportunities to wage war. 
A peace through war strategy was sadly the only way to advance the process and end the 
vicious circle of war, but we still don’t know what the eventual long-term outcome of one- 
party state will bring to Angola. 
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